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Article

Categorizing Student Speech
Alexander Tsesis †
INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest complexities of free speech doctrine involves distinguishing between constitutionally protected communications and those that the Supreme Court considers outside
the First Amendment’s protective purview. This dichotomy is
sharply pronounced in cases reviewing public school restrictions
on student digital, verbal, and written statements. Courts jumble the precedents by sometimes treating students as civic participants and other times treating them as immature wards.
Lack of consistency in this area of law has created circuit splits
over when school administrators may constitutionally punish
student speech that occurs inside or outside the school. This Article explains the contextual balance required to correct the internal conflicts between jurisprudence that recognizes students
retain First Amendment rights at school and a different line of
case law that deferentially affirms school censorship without
subjecting it to exacting scrutiny.1
The Court has recently qualified core student speech precedents rather than overturning them outright. A student’s right
to express personal opinions, artistic acumen, or political insights remains sacrosanct, but as of late the Court has taken a
decidedly less speech-protective analytical direction, and lower
† Raymond & Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and Professor of
Law, Loyola University Chicago College of Law. I owe debts of gratitude to Enrique Armijo, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Marc Blitz, Katie Eyer, David Han, Randy
Kozel, Toni Massaro, Mollie McKinley, David Thaw, and Andrew Tutt. I am
grateful for the opportunity to workshop this paper at the Yale Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference. Copyright © 2018 by Alexander Tsesis.
1. For earlier works on K–12 speech doctrine see, e.g., AMY GUTMANN,
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987); CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP:
HOW SCHOOLS AND COURTS SUBVERT STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
(2015); Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395 (2011); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student
Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027 (2008).
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courts have followed its lead. A majority of justices have become
increasingly deferential to school administrators’ judgments to
censor expressive content about matters such as drug policy and
raunchy political school speeches. The judicial trend is to be categorical about the content of speech that school districts, principals, and teachers can prohibit and to be less rigorous of the evidence educators must provide courts to justify adverse actions
against students.
The Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on school officials’
judgments has legitimized less rigorous review of cases challenging the suppression of student expression, rather than demanding that the officials rigorously hold to First Amendment principles. The Court has repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness
to closely scrutinize school boards’ disciplinary measures imposed on students for the manner and substance of their expressions, emboldening state legislators to adopt harsh disciplinary
laws against student speech. 2 Many of the statutes rely on ambiguous terms, including “boisterous conduct” 3 and “disturbance,” 4 granting school administrators broad, ad hoc discretionary powers, rather than limiting them to narrowly tailored
restrictions on free speech. Lower court judges have also embraced the Court’s increasingly lenient student speech doctrine,
consigning to educators broad latitude to make policies about
which pupil expressions are appropriate. 5
Judicial reliance on rigid categories to identify protected
student speech reflects a broader trend in First Amendment jurisprudence. The Roberts Court has spearheaded a categorical
approach to free speech analysis.6 Its stated methodology relies
on a historical framework that is purportedly rooted in principles
existing at the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791. 7 Upon
2. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911 (2016); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 32210 (West 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-06-16 (2016).
3. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-06-16 (2016) (“It is a class B misdemeanor for
any person to . . . willfully interfere with or interrupt the proper order or management of a public school by . . . boisterous conduct.”).
4. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32210 (2014) (titled “willful disturbance of public
school or meeting, offense”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-06-16 (2016) (titled “Disturbance of a public school-penalty”).
5. See infra Part II.
6. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (adopting a historical
and traditional approach to identifying low level speech and denying to the legislature any “freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside
the scope of the First Amendment”).
7. Id. at 468.
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closer examination, however, the evolution of free speech jurisprudence has been more nuanced and contextual than the listing
of unprotected forms of communication. 8 Since 2010, the Court
has articulated an absolutist-sounding free speech doctrine that
prohibits judges from engaging in ad hoc balancing of social issues. In this context, the Court has identified a limited number
of speech categories that it regards to be historically unprotected
forms of communication.9
Student speech has never been among those categories the
Court has included in its unprotected list. To the contrary, students have traditionally been found to retain their right of selfexpression even during school hours. 10 They are young citizens,
finding their individual voices, and contributing to public debates, if only in their academic niches. Consequently, the Court
has historically been skeptical of censorship, except in those
cases involving students who have substantially disrupted the
educational environment or materially interfered with others’
rights. 11 Increasingly, however, students’ ability to express controversial opinions has been jeopardized by a pattern of judicial
deference to school administrators. Some district and appellate
courts afford minimal constitutional protections to students who
use off-campus computers to post hyperbolic comments that are
later read or viewed on campus through social media websites.12
8. See Alexander Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech Doctrine and Contextualization, 65 EMORY L.J. 495, 506–14 (2015) (arguing that while the Court
claims to be relying on history and tradition to identify low value speech, the
actual categories the Court relies on are based on carefully balanced policy considerations).
9. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (“[C]ontent-based
restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the ‘historic and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to
the bar.’” (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010)).
10. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
11. Id. at 513.
12. Compare Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 398–400 (5th
Cir. 2015) (holding that the school board’s approved punishment for a threatening rap song recorded off campus but intimidating the targeted teacher at school
did not violate the student’s right of free speech), and S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v.
Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that a
preliminary injunction was inappropriately granted to students who had created an off-campus racist website to be read by classmates, which school officials
could have reasonably expected to impact school activities), with J.S. ex rel.
Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932–33 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that school officials cannot suspend a student for off-campus speech because
a different student brought a copy of the communication to school).
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This judicial trend has emboldened officials to police the content
of student expressions without complying with heightened review of disciplinary decisions. 13
Officials typically make disciplinary decisions based on legitimate desires to advance learning and the safety of students.
However, without adequate judicial oversight to ensure that
school restrictions do not compromise free speech values, courts
leave too much room for restricting personal or political views to
the sole discretion of teachers, principals, and school boards. Administrators’ educational expertise certainly exceeds those of ordinary judges; however, the judiciary remains the foremost authority on constitutional interpretation. Final determination
about the constitutionality of speech limitations should therefore
remain the province of courts. Without heightened First Amendment scrutiny, student communications are left at the behest of
subjective administrative judgments that broadly vary from
school district to school district and from principal to principal.
Safeguarding students’ abilities to openly explore controversial public subjects, to express themselves artistically, and to
learn valuable information requires a fine-tuned standard of judicial review. This Article argues: (1) that any restriction on student political speech expressed outside a school sponsored event,
class, or assembly, should be subject to strict scrutiny; and (2)
where speech is within the auspices of schools, courts should apply a contextual form of intermediate scrutiny to review censorship decisions.
Part I provides doctrinal background for evaluating restrictions on student speech. It details the marked transformation of student speech doctrine from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 14 in which the Court
scrutinized the administration’s actions, to Morse v. Frederick, 15
in which the Court largely deferred to the administration. Part
II turns to the categorical speech doctrine, explaining its roots in
United States v. Stevens 16 and its progeny. These cases formalized free speech analysis outside the realm of student speech,
narrowing the classes of expression beyond the pale of First
Amendment protections. Although the Court did not list derisive
student speech among the low-value categories, the Court’s re13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra Part II.B.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
559 U.S. 460 (2010).
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cent erosion of the Tinker doctrine has effectively rendered student communications among those few whose content can be
suppressed without being subject to strict scrutiny review. After
exploring Supreme Court precedents, Part II then turns to recent lower court opinions extending schools’ discretionary authority to police contemporary technologies such as Facebook,
Twitter, and email servers. The discussion deals with on-campus
and off-campus communications of intimidation, incitement,
threat, cyber-bullying, and hyperbole.
Part III develops a framework for adjudicating school regulations that impose substantial burdens on student communications. The proposed approach is significantly more nuanced and
contextual than the current ad hoc test judges have relied on to
evaluate educators’ and administrators’ decisions. It proffers a
three-tiered approach. In discussions of ideas, self-assertion, and
political speech, stated in the playground, near the school, by
lockers, and other unstructured activities, courts should use
strict scrutiny analysis. In circumstances, where limitations on
students are created to advance certain content-neutral time,
place, and manner concerns, the intermediate scrutiny standard
is appropriate. Finally, officials should be granted the greatest
discretion when dealing with speech that is neither political nor
informational, such as obscenity, true threats, and plagiarism.
This balanced method of review maintains the intellectual space
for students to develop into thoughtful adults and to engage in
social discourse while retaining sufficient discretion for pedagogical discipline. Balancing does not succumb to oversimplified categories; therefore, in some circumstances schools might identify
other constitutional interests that outweigh student expression.
Illustrative of the latter point are narrowly tailored rules against
wearing confederate symbols in schools to administer the Thirteenth Amendment’s injunction against the badges of slavery. In
any case, student First Amendment rights can be better secured
through contextual analysis rather than by categorical framing.
I. SCHOOL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Recognizing that constitutional protection of free speech applies equally to youths as it does to adults, early Supreme Court
precedents on student speech robustly protected students who
wished to express controversial viewpoints at schools. Youths
communicate about matters at the core of the First Amendment,
including topics on deliberative democracy, personal development, and informative facts. However, the school speech doctrine
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has gradually eroded to diminish student autonomy and to expand educators’ prerogatives over administrative suppression of
statements and opinions. This Part discusses the most important Supreme Court precedents establishing the student
speech doctrine. Initially, in Tinker, the Court set a clearly defined test, prohibiting schools from restricting student speech
unless it caused a substantial disruption. 17 However, the more
recent opinions of Fraser and Morse rely on ad hoc tests of vulgarity and illegality, without requiring proof of disruption. 18 The
later cases augmented school administrators’ authority to censor
unconventional student views, while stifling student opposition
to school policies or to existing law. The Morse majority went so
far as to sanction a principal’s exercise of disciplinary authority
against students who displayed a sign on the sidewalk across the
street from the school.19
The seminal case on the constitutional status of student
speech, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, arose from complaints filed against school officials who
had attempted to ban political speech on campuses. 20 In 1965, as
the United States was building up military forces in Vietnam, 21
several adults and children met in Des Moines, Iowa and agreed
to wear black armbands in civil protest of the expanded U.S. involvement in that armed conflict. Among them were two high
school students and one elementary school student. 22
Determined to stop the children from protesting at school,
principals throughout the city committed to a joint policy of preventing students from wearing armbands. 23 As a result, officials
suspended the three students for refusing demands to remove
the insignia at school. 24 All of them testified at trial that wearing
the armbands signaled sorrow at the loss of life and support for
17. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
18. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 676 (1986); Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408–10 (2007).
19. Morse, 551 U.S. at 408–10.
20. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
21. JONATHAN COLMAN, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON 52–
53 (2010) (discussing the rapid expansion of the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam between 1965 and 1966); YAACOV VERTZBERGER, RISK TAKING AND DECISIONMAKING 265 (1998) (“In a television broadcast on July 28, 1965, Johnson
announced that additional U.S. troops would be sent to fight in South Vietnam.”).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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a truce in Vietnam. 25 The prohibition prevented students from
expressing their ideas on a significant public debate.
The Supreme Court majority in Tinker held that the suspension violated the students’ constitutional rights to free speech. 26
In one of the most insightful and influential statements, Justice
Abe Fortas wrote that students do not “shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.” 27 The students wore armbands both as a personal protest
against U.S. engagement in the Vietnam conflict and to influence others’ thinking on the matter: these were self-assertive
acts protected by the Free Speech Clause.28 As a rule, school authorities can only rely on neutral criteria—such as time, place,
and manner,29 or limited public-forum restrictions 30—to punish
students for demonstrative expressions. In the key portion of the
case, the Court ruled that school administrators can order students to desist from expressive behavior that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others.” 31 For half a century, that has been the abiding law of free speech at public schools; although, subsequent
case law has narrowed its initial breadth of protection for K–12
students’ free speech.32
Given the importance of obtaining instruction and expressing personal views, school suppression of speech can only be undertaken upon the school’s proof that the student “substantially
interfere[d] with the work of the school or impinge[d] upon the
rights of other students.”33 Merely creating audience “discomfort
or unpleasantness“34 by expressing unpopular views is not

25. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972
(S.D. Iowa 1966), rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
26. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513–14.
27. Id. at 506.
28. Id. at 514.
29. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116–19 (1972) (upholding, under the First Amendment, an anti-noise regulation, tailored for the particular needs of an educational institution, creating neutral restrictions for protests conducted on sidewalks adjacent to a school).
30. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111–12 (2001)
(holding “that speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed
from a religious viewpoint”).
31. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
32. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
33. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
34. Id. at 509.
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enough for school authorities to interfere with a fundamental liberty. 35 In Tinker, the school failed to demonstrate that by wearing armbands the students had materially and substantially disrupted school activities.36 Justice Fortas made clear that school
officials do not have unbridled authority to determine whether
there has been substantial disruption; rather, courts must rely
on independent judgment to evaluate whether the evidence sufficiently justifies the suppression of student expression.37 In
Tinker, the Court evaluated the record, finding no “evidence that
the school authorities had reason to anticipate” 38 that by wearing armbands, students would substantially interfere with
learning. 39 This was not merely a rational basis of review, but a
close scrutiny of the school’s decision to interfere with students’
right of free speech by setting content or viewpoint restrictions
on expression.
Tinker contributed a variety of insights into the school
speech area. For example, students retain constitutional rights
even when they express messages contrary to those favored by
school authorities. 40 Public school officials fall under the Fourteenth Amendment definition of state actors. 41 They cannot conduct themselves outside the parameters of constitutional guarantees, without regard to students’ maturity and inexperience.
Justice Fortas further wrote for the majority that totalitarian
authority over students has no place in public schools. 42 The
state must respect the fundamental right of free speech; students are not merely the recipients of communications but are at
35. Id.
36. Id. at 514.
37. Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights
at the Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 533–34
(2000) (“[I]t is not for a court to accept the claims of school officials about the
need to stop the speech; the court must independently review the facts and determine whether there is sufficient evidence of significant disruptive effect to
justify punishing expression.”); C. Thomas Dienes & Annemargaret Connolly,
When Students Speak: Judicial Review in the Academic Marketplace, 7 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 343, 359 (1989) (“[T]he Court demands substantial governmental
justification for the burdens that school officials impose on student speech.”).
38. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 506 (“In order for the state in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show
that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 511.

2018]

CATEGORIZING STUDENT SPEECH

1155

liberty to express their sentiments without first receiving official
approval. 43 Judge Fortas’ statement that the marketplace of
ideas requires “vigilant protection . . . in the community of American schools” 44 is tied to the democratic model of education. 45
This view of public education elaborated the same principles that
informed the Brown v. Board of Education opinion, where Chief
Justice Warren stressed that public schools awaken “the child to
cultural values.” 46 To this point, Tinker adds that students contribute to culture and education.47 Education, therefore, benefits
democratic learning and democratic engagement.
Following the creation of this integrative conception of student speech as an instrument essential to education and childhood development, the Court gradually beveled away at the
moorings of Tinker, becoming increasingly deferential to school
authorities. Beginning with Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser, 48 the Court regularly created categories of presumed
lower value student speech and did not apply the Tinker standard to them. With changes to Court membership having shifted
the institution in a more conservative direction, the Fraser majority accepted a school’s imposition of punishment for verbal
communication. 49 The high school student had been disciplined
for a nominating speech on behalf of a fellow student that was
delivered at a high school assembly, attended by students as
young as fourteen years of age. 50 It contained “an elaborate,
43. Id.
44. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
45. Id. Among the purposes of democratic education is the development of
good character, the imparting of moral reasoning, the engagement with deliberative participation. See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 50–52
(1987).
46. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
47. That flexible protection of liberties, among which speech is only one,
has a broad range of implications about other constitutional limits on school
officials on matters like school searches; although, the Supreme Court has been
quite deferential to their uses of authority. While Tinker heralded an expansion
of constitutional protections for student free speech, this expansion did not
translate into other areas such as school search and seizure nor into administration of corporal punishments. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341
(1985) (finding that in a school setting, reasonableness, rather than probable
cause, suffices for a school purse search); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683
(1977) (holding that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not apply
to school settings and common law state protections safeguard students’ due
process interests).
48. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
49. Id. at 685.
50. Id. at 677.
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graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor,” 51 which teachers had
warned the speaker were inappropriate and might subject him
to disciplinary censure.52 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Burger acknowledged the “undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms,” but
stressed that value “must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.” 53 Justice Burger gave wide latitude
to schools, adopting the perspective of historians who had argued
that public education inculcates “habits and manners of civility
as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and
the nation.” 54
Justice Burger differentiated the case from Tinker, where
the ability to express political views had been at stake. 55 On the
other hand, in Fraser, the public school undertook “to prohibit
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”56 By
this explanation, the Court acceded to school officials’ contentbased censorship. The holding is understandable, in large part
because the speech sparked a reaction from the use of vulgar
gestures during a speech presented at a school function. Even
the high value of free speech, Justice Burger found, did not require educators to abandon their responsibility for students’
character developed in the face public misbehavior. 57 Such an

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 677–78.
Id. at 681.
Id. (quoting CHARLES BEARD, MARY BEARD & WILLIAM BEARD, NEW
BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1960)). The connection between education and good habits is in fact ancient in Anglo-American culture. See, e.g.,
Etna, 8 F. Cas. 803, 804 (D. Me. 1838) (“ The community has a deep interest in
preserving the rectitude of the young, and in imparting to them such an education and training them to such habits as will render them in manhood useful
and not pernicious members of society.”); 1 MARIA EDGEWORTH & R. L. EDGEWORTH, PRACTICAL EDUCATION 334 (2d ed. 1801) (“As the understanding unfolds we should fortify all our pupils’ good habits, and virtuous enthusiasm, by
the conviction of their utility, of their being essential to the happiness of society
in general, and conducive immediately to the happiness of every individual.”);
T.C. FOSTER, A VERBATIM REPORT OF THE GREAT DIOCESAN MEETING AT WARRINGTON 44 (1839) (asserting that it is the duty of school masters to instill “good
dispositions, good habits, good principles, good conduct, founded on religious
motives”).
55. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
56. Id. at 676.
57. Id. at 685–86.
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approach empowers school officials to maintain an orderly learning environment at school sponsored events without substantial
disruption. These conclusions are in line with Tinker. However,
there is reason to question the Court’s perfunctory acceptance of
the Bethel School Board’s characterization of events.
While the indecency may have been clear to the Fraser majority, the evidence does not seem to have been at all so conclusive. The court of appeals, to the contrary, found that only three
students of an assembly of six hundred students were boisterous
and that the education process was not at all disrupted.58 At
trial, a school counselor testified that the level of student response was not out of the ordinary in these sorts of assemblies. 59
The district court, “applying the variable test for obscenity as to
high school students,” 60 had found that the speech was “not obscene” for the high school audience.61
Ordinarily speakers may purposefully resort to expletives
and perhaps even vulgarities to make a public point about anything from a presidential election to a military policy. Given the
potential for officials to suppress students’ core speech rights,
judicial oversight remains essential to safeguard constitutional
values. Judges should deal with specific counterclaims of expression and disruption rather than dismissing out of hand factual
findings of the trial court. The Court’s understandable skittishness against acting as a super-school board does not gainsay the
judiciary’s constitutional obligation to demand a school to furnish rigorous proof of disruption in a matter implicating political
speech. To provide more guidance to schools and lower court
judges, the Fraser Court might have more clearly limited the
holding to vulgar statements at public assemblies or at school
functions with young children present, thereby recognizing that
not all sexual innuendo used by students is actionable by high
schools. 62
58. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985).
59. Id. at 1359.
60. Brief for Respondents, E.L. Fraser at 12, Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (No. 84-1667), 1985 WL 670006 *29.
61. Id.
62. There is some indication that the Court means its holding to be limited:
“A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.” Fraser,
478 U.S. at 685. However, the Court also uses broader discretionary language
that would indicate broader school official powers: “ The First Amendment does
not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and
lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.” Id.

1158

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:1147

Following Fraser, the Court doubled down on its deference
to school administrators in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, 63 approving administrative censorship of students
who sought to publish articles about social issues in a school
newspaper.64 Hazelwood arose after a high school principal refused to permit the publication of two stories. 65 One story dealt
with teenage pregnancy and the other with the developmental
adjustment of children after parental divorce. 66 Any state prohibition against publishing such content in an ordinary newspaper
would have certainly violated free speech doctrine against prior
restraints of the press. 67
The principal openly admitted that the decision to deny publication was content based. 68 Arguably at least, the topic of pregnancy may have been inappropriate for some younger students.
The Court found the principal might have “reasonably been concerned” that parents and boyfriends discussed in the article had
not been given the opportunity to respond to sensitive charges. 69
Although the pregnant students who were discussed in the story
were pseudonymous, the principal was concerned members of
the school community might recognize their real identities. 70
Nevertheless, the Court’s rationale contained phrasing that cut
into students’ expressive interests.
While the Hazelwood Court continued to quote the Tinker
statement that students did not give up all their free speech
rights at school, the majority found that public school students’
First Amendment rights “are not automatically coextensive with
the rights of adults in other settings.” 71 The Hazelwood majority
deferred to educators, treating student speech on subjects of in-

63. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
64. Id. at 276.
65. Id. at 263.
66. Id.
67. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (asserting that
prior restraint is “the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights”); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714
(1971) (per curiam) (“‘Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’” (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963))).
68. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263 (stating the various content-based reasons
the principal denied publication of the two articles).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 263.
71. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
682 (1986)).
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terest to student journalists and readers as being low-value communications, asserting “what manner of speech in the classroom
or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the
school board.” 72 This pithy statement signaled a remarkable assignment of judicial power to interpret the Constitution to educators. School officials, the majority found, are entitled to regulate the newspaper content without even being subject to the
rigors of intermediate, much less, strict scrutiny. 73 The Court
sought to distinguish school-sponsored newspaper stories from
the armband protest of Tinker,74 even though both were about
controversial subjects disapproved of by school officials. The reasoning in Hazelwood nevertheless expanded school officials’ powers to discriminate on the basis of content and viewpoint lowvalue speech by a mere showing of reasonableness. 75 The majority made clear that it regarded student speech in school-created
fora to be a separate category of First Amendment doctrine.76
The Hazelwood reliance on rational scrutiny demonstrated
the Supreme Court’s increased willingness to defer to public officials’ discretion over student expressions, even when strictures
overtly suppress contents and viewpoints. The succeeding case
was even more deferential to school authorities. Morse v. Frederick, which the Court decided in 2007, did not involve speech at
school, nor a column in a school newspaper. 77 The school suspended Joseph Frederick for displaying a large banner with,
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” and refusing the school principal’s request to furl it. 78 The offending students planned the protest to
coincide with the Olympic torch passing by the school and hoped
their stunt would thereby garner press coverage.79 Frederick displayed the messages on the sidewalk across from the school.80 At
no point during the display did he enter school grounds. 81 Finding herself rebuffed by Frederick’s recalcitrance, the principal
walked off the school grounds, across the street, grabbed the
72. Id. at 267 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).
73. Id. at 276.
74. Id. at 270–71.
75. Id. at 274.
76. Id. at 273 (“ This standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that
the education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents,
teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges.”).
77. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007).
78. Id. at 397–98.
79. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2006).
80. Id. at 1115.
81. Id.
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sign, and then suspended him from school for advocating illegal
drug use. 82 Her administrative action was an undeniable form of
subject and viewpoint discrimination, which under ordinary circumstances would have warranted strict scrutiny review.
The principal read into Frederick’s message. At oral argument, Justice Souter suggested that the student might have
been making a political statement, calling for the legalization of
marijuana, but not for its use by students.83 On the other hand,
the statement might have been a parody 84 or public commentary, 85 both of which Tinker indicates are protected at school
and, even more so, outside of it. In his dissent, Justice Stevens
also recognized this point, asserting that allowing a principal to
suspend the student for an “obtuse reference to marijuana,” the
advocacy of which “was at best subtle and ambiguous,” overbroad, with “no stopping point” to prevent the school from further encroaching on speech. 86
Despite the inherent ambiguity of Frederick’s four-word
message, the speculation as to its meaning, the parody of it, and
the political debate it might have engendered, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority in Morse, did not engage in heightened scrutiny. Instead, he accepted the principal’s assessment
without adequately balancing Frederick’s claim to free expression. 87 The Court’s rational basis approach might have made
sense had Frederick caused a substantial disruption of school,
but nothing of the type appears from the record. Rather than demanding the principal to provide compelling or substantial reasons for punishing a student for speech in a traditional public
forum, a locus where the Court has long recognized the need for

82. Id.
83. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, Frederick v. Morse, 551 U.S. 393
(2007) (No. 06-278), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/2006/06-278.pdf.
84. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (finding the
First Amendment protects parody).
85. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (asserting that “[t]he policy of the First Amendment favors dissemination of information and opinion” on
public matters).
86. Morse, 551 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 408–10 (noting that the principal’s actions were justified because of the dangers of drug use); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537,
2550 (2012) (“Freedom of speech and thought flows not from the beneficence of
the state but from the inalienable rights of the person.”).
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strict scrutiny review,88 the holding in Morse relies on the principal’s sensibilities of student propriety. 89 And she made a decision, not about some acting out at school, but an adolescent’s behavior on the public sidewalk. By requiring no empirical proof
and taking the principal’s word as to both the sign’s meaning and
the foreseeable possibility of discipline breaking down because
of the pro-drug message, the majority treated student off-campus speech as a low value category, one that requires neither
strict nor intermediate scrutiny. Although it did not overrule
Tinker, Morse sharply curtailed the constitutional protection of
student expression and enabled school officials to undercut student engagement in the marketplace of ideas. Now, school officials only need to make a reasonable inference about the consequences of student speech, without proving it to have been
disruptive. 90 Of even greater consequence, the Court countenanced the school’s censorship of contrarian speech with an arguably political message.
Frederick expressed himself off school grounds and did not
make his statement on a thoroughfare connected to school. He
and other students sought to garner attention by gathering near
school when journalists were present. The record contained no
indication that Frederick’s conduct met the Tinker heightened
scrutiny test for justifiable school restraint on student expression: he had not materially and substantially disrupted schoolwork or school functions. In fact, the principal instigated the altercation. Moreover, the Court should have distinguished Morse
from Hazelwood because Frederick had not sought to publish the
message on a school platform. Furthermore, he displayed the
sign away from the official school event, albeit within ready view
of school officials. The Morse majority relied on rational basis review, as if student speech that could be interpreted to advocate
illegal conduct were a category unprotected by First Amendment

88. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983) (“In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the state to limit expressive activity
are sharply circumstantial.”).
89. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (asserting that
rational basis review allows for “a legislative choice” that “is not subject to courtroom fact finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data”).
90. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 (“[W]e hold that schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded
as encouraging illegal drug use.”).
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norms, history, and tradition.91 This conclusion has had farreaching implications about students’ abilities to advocate
against existing legal rules.
II. THE CATEGORICAL FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE AND
MODERN SCHOOL DILEMMAS
By increasingly deferring to school officials’ pedagogical
judgments, the Court has created a de facto, albeit inchoate, category of lower level speech that had not previously been defined
in judicial or scholarly literature. 92 The plasticity of the rational
basis test threatens student political and self-expressive speech.
The new direction in student speech has significantly shifted
from the Tinker standard for the protection of students’ abilities
to express controversial views on heated subjects. Even when a
school suppressed speech because of its content—such as when
the school newspaper sought to publish articles on subjects disapproved by the school principal or students used impropriety at
school events—the Court refused to engage in heightened review. 93 Much student speech is now treated as low value communication that is unprotected by the First Amendment.
The Roberts Court has repeatedly asserted that regulations
of certain categories of adult speech—including obscene and
fraudulent speech—likewise raise no First Amendment concerns. The latitude the Supreme Court showed school officials in
Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse has created a similar low status
for various forms of students’ expressions, asserted on and off
campuses, and diminished the judicial role of protecting a core
constitutional liberty. Lower court opinions that were rendered
after Morse are a patchwork of ad hoc conclusions about the
school officials’ latitude to suppress artistic and political statements. Courts often treat student communications as if they

91. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 406 (1992) (relying on rational standard of review in the context of “categories of unprotected speech”);
see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640–41 (1968) (providing an example of a category of speech requiring only rational basis review).
92. CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP: HOW SCHOOLS AND
COURTS SUBVERT STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 94 (2015) (recognizing
the Supreme Court’s “taxonomy of censorship for student speech” and how the
chosen category “determines the level of constitutional protection the speech
receives”).
93. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) (holding that
content-based regulations must be reviewed on the basis of the strict scrutiny
analysis).
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were part of a low-value category along the lines asserted in Stevens, Entertainment Merchants, and Alvarez.94
Such treatment endangers free speech rights, especially
when it results in deference to school officials who often seem
prone to favor discipline over free speech. Some examples will
help illustrate the point: A high senior, Jakob, in the Clear Fork
High School in Ohio was suspended for retweeting a message in
favor of an individual who was suing the district to decriminalize
marijuana. 95 The suspension was significant blow to Jakob’s life
prospects.96 He had nearly a straight A grade point average and
was the second highest scorer on his soccer team.97 Prior to the
suspension he had been an attractive candidate to college recruiters.98 The blot on Jakob’s transcript diminished his available options for a college scholarship.99 In a different case, a high
school in Staten Island, New York suspended a student for
tweeting a photograph with an image of a teacher’s automobile
parked next to a “No Parking” traffic sign and adding that he
hoped the van would soon be towed.100 So too an eighth grader
who wore a patriotic t-shirt in support of fallen soldiers was suspended by a rigid rule against shirt designs with “violence related reference.” 101 His shirt had images of boots, helmet, and
gun, along with the words, “Standing for those who stood for us,”
and was clearly a political statement. 102 But the Supreme
Court’s deference to educators’ decisions, in preference to
Tinker’s more rigorous protections of student speech, left even
patriotic statements at the ad hoc discretion of teachers. At a
high school, journalists were suspended for refusing to follow
94. See infra text accompanying notes 86–106.
95. Linda Martz, Senior Athlete Suspended for Weed-Related Retweet Sues
District, MANSFIELD NEWS J. (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.mansfieldnewsjounal
.com/story/news/2014/04/10/clear-fork-senior-suspended-for-weed-related
-retweet-sues-district/7566503.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Daniel Leddy, Advance Legal Columnist: The Issue of Students’ FreeSpeech Rights is a Murky Area, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE (Feb. 26, 2013), http://
www.silive.com/opinion/danielleddy/index.ssf/2013/02/advance_legal_
columnist_the_is.html.
101. Eugene Volokh, Eighth-Grader Suspended for Not Removing Patriotic
T-Shirt Depicting a Fallen Soldier ’s Rifle, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2015/10/12/eighth-grader-suspended-for-not-removing-patriotic-t-shirt
-depicting-a-fallen-soldiers-rifle.
102. Id.
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their principal’s mandate to use the Redskins team name because they regarded it to be offensive. 103 Examples of this type
could be multiplied, but these should suffice to illustrate the
gravity of censorship associated with unbridled administrative
restrictions of free speech rights at the high school and grade
school levels.
This Part of the Article demonstrates that the Supreme
Court’s newly loosened approach to student speech is part of a
broader categorical analysis that derides the balancing of interests. Lower courts increasingly review controversial student
statements by the extent to which school censorship is analogous
to one of the categories the Supreme Court has found to be of low
value: vulgar, school-sponsored, or advocating illegality.104 This
categorical doctrine has resulted in a chilling of students who
wish to express themselves freely about matters of social, communal, and personal importance. In Section A, I describe the formalistic doctrine that enumerates categories of unprotected
speech but requires strict scrutiny analysis for other content restrictions. In Section B, I demonstrate that various lower courts
have understood recent Supreme Court developments to relegate
on and off-campus student speech to a low-value category, subject only to rational basis review.
A. CATEGORICAL FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE
Outside the student speech cases, the Court has become
more formalistic in its approach to free speech cases. In Stevens,
Entertainment Merchants, and Alvarez, a majority of Justices derided judicial balancing of free speech against other values.
While the Justices have never asserted that student speech is
outside the purview of the First Amendment—thus Tinker technically remains intact—the recent turn in favor of school administrators effectively (although not explicitly) treats student
speech within a set of expressions that only receives the lowest
level of adjudicative scrutiny.
The Court first articulated the existence of low value speech
in a seminal 1942 decision, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 105

103. When Educators Become Censors, Students Are Marginalized: Editorial, NJ.COM (Oct. 12. 2014), http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/10/
when_teachers_become_censors_the_students_suffer_editorial.html.
104. See supra Part I.
105. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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which upheld a state statute that criminalized the use of “offensive, derisive, or annoying words” in public place.106 The majority read the statute narrowly, under a newly created fighting
words doctrine: the First Amendment does not prohibit government from criminalizing speech whose very utterance inflicts injury or tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace. 107
Fighting words are among a “class of speech” government can
censure without running afoul of the First Amendment. 108 The
majority also defined other classes of speech, including “the lewd
and obscene, the profane, [and] the libelous,” whose prevention
and punishment did not raise First Amendment concerns.109 In
Chaplinsky, the Court nowhere indicated that these categories
are rigid, exhaustive, or historical. To the contrary, the majority
explained that those types of expressions were outside the scope
of the Free Speech Clause because their “utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.” 110 The Court, therefore, regarded social valuations of some expressions to be legitimate because of its potential
to generate disorders, such as immediate breaches of the peace.
While the Court listed only a limited group of unprotected expressions, based on later jurisprudence, to this list should be
added misleading and illegal advertisement, 111 workplace sexual
harassment,112 and conspiracy to commit crimes. 113
For decades, academics and courts regarded Chaplinsky to
have established a balancing test, requiring judges to identify
and weigh the relevant demands of free expression and of public
regulation. 114 History and precedent certainly played a role, but
106. Id. at 568.
107. Id. at 572.
108. Id. at 571–72.
109. Id. at 572.
110. Id.
111. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976).
112. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 410 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
113. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
114. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976) (citing Chaplinsky to determine the appropriate way to identify “a more appropriate accommodation between the public’s interest in an uninhibited press and its equally
compelling need for judicial redress of libelous utterances”); Iannarelli v. Morton, 327 F. Supp. 873, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (discussing Chaplinsky balancing);
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judges identified unprotected categories of speech by their inclusion or exclusion from core free speech values of self-expression,
political participation, or informative content.
More recent decisions of the Roberts Court have used formalistic and categorical language. Rather than following the
Chaplinsky balancing formula, in 2009, with United States v.
Stevens,115 the Court began relying on a presumption of calcified
categories, whose existence it supposed to be fixed at the year
the Bill of Rights were ratified.116 Chief Justice Roberts, who
wrote the majority opinion in Stevens, explained away the Chaplinsky recognition of balancing in First Amendment cases, as a
“descriptive statement” about rigid categories. 117 This perspective discounts the use of rigorous balancing criteria for rendering
judgment.118 As I have shown elsewhere, it also overlooks judicial creation of low value speech categories—such as child pornography, obscenity, and fighting words—in twentieth century
decisions rather than in 1791.119
Marc Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107, 127 n.90 (1963) (relying on
Chaplinsky style balancing); Henry H. Foster, Jr., The Relation and Correlation
of Freedom and Security, 58 W. VA. L. REV. 325, 349 n.73 (1956) (listing Chaplinsky among cases deploying balancing analysis); Nadine Strossen, United
States v. Stevens: Restricting Two Major Rationales for Content-Based Speech
Restrictions, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67, 81 (arguing that the last sentence of
Chaplinsky invites judges to engage in open-ended balancing).
115. 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
116. This originalist conception appeared in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
in R.A.V.:
From 1791 to the present, however, our society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech
in a few limited areas, which are “of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” We have recognized that “the freedom of speech” referred to by the First Amendment
does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.
505 U.S. at 382–83 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)).
117. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471 (2010).
118. I’ve developed a rigorous balancing test consisting of: (1) whether the
expression at issue is likely to implicate specific constitutional, statutory, or
common law harms; (2) whether the restriction on speech is based on a historical or traditional doctrine; (3) whether any government policies benefitting the
general welfare weigh in favor of the regulation; (4) whether the regulation on
speech closely fits the public ends that is sought; and (5) whether there are any
less restrictive alternatives to achieving them. Alexander Tsesis, Multifactoral
Free Speech, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1017, 1036 (2016).
119. See generally Tsesis, supra note 8 (explaining the ways in which low
value speech categories are overlooked).
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In Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
held the Animal Crush Videos Act to be facially unconstitutional. 120 The statute had criminalized the creation, distribution,
or possession of crush videos depicting actual suffocation, drowning, and infliction of injuries on non-human animals.121 The case
specifically addressed the federal limitation on visual depictions
and distributions of videos containing images of the brutal
crushing of animals, conduct which all fifty states punish
through anti-cruelty statutes.122 Ultimately, the Court determined the statute was substantially overbroad, censoring even
protected expressions, such as hunting videos. 123 More importantly for our discussion on the current status of school
speech, the Court assayed against “ad hoc balancing of relative
social costs and benefits,” determined to prevent judges from using a “free-floating test for First Amendment coverage.” 124 The
Stevens Court held fast to a concern that weighing analysis was
“highly manipulable.” 125 The only regulations the Court found
the First Amendment allowed are those that target historically
and traditionally recognized forms of low level speech such as
obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to
a crime. 126 According to the Court’s line of reasoning, violent
video depictions were not among any historical or traditional categories of low value speech, and therefore the prohibition against
their depiction was a content based intrusion on expression. As
I will demonstrate in Section B of this Part, the very manipulability the Court initiated in the crush video case is the one that
it, inconsistently, imbedded in the student speech cases.
Following up, the year after the Stevens decision, Justice
Scalia further entrenched the categorical reasoning in his opinion to Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, which
struck a state law that restricted the sale and rental of violent
video games to minors. 127 As in Stevens, the majority refused to
defer to public officials’ assessments of speech unworthy of constitutional protection. The Court made clear that “without per-

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Stevens, 559 U.S. at 497 (2010).
Id. at 497 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006)).
H. R. REP. No. 106-397, at 2–4 (1999).
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 486.
Id. at 461, 470.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 468.
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
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suasive evidence” that some new restriction on expressive content “is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of
proscription,” lawmakers cannot alter First Amendment doctrine on the basis of balancing assessments about the social costs
and benefits of controversial expressions.128 Scalia was not remiss to assert that even the judiciary must not multiply the limited number of low-value speech categories such as obscenity, incitement, fraud, defamation, speech linked to criminal activity,
and fighting words. 129 This list, he claimed constituted a “welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.” 130
The Supreme Court confirmed its commitment to the brightline, categorical approach in United States v. Alvarez, where it
found the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 to be unconstitutional. 131 The
decision overturned the conviction of Xavier Alvarez, who had
lied about having been awarded the Congressional Medal of
Honor.132 In his plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy condemned
the use of any “free-floating test” of “ad hoc balancing of relative
social costs and benefits” and characterized it as “startling and
dangerous.”133 In the school speech area, several scholars have
questioned the merits of the Stevens categorical approach and its
rigidity in follow-up cases like Alvarez, 134 but, even leaving aside
128. Id. at 792.
129. Id. at 790–91.
130. Id. at 791(citing Chaplisky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72
(1942).
131. 132 S. Ct. at 2551 (2012) (plurality opinion).
132. Id. at 2542.
133. Id. at 2544 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)).
134. See Tsesis, supra note 8, at 506–14 (demonstrating that the Court’s categorical approach deviates from the balancing intrinsic to foundational obscenity, fraud, and defamation precedents); see also William D. Araiza, Citizens
United, Stevens, and Humanitarian Law Project: First Amendment Rules and
Standards in Three Acts, 40 STETSON L. REV. 821, 836–37 (2011) (recognizing
that rigid rules do have some value for interpretation because “they provide
enough of a thumb on the judicial scale to produce predictable results that do a
reasonably good job of protecting the constitutional value at issue,” but cautioning that some judges might invoke rigid rules “to hide behind that standard
when striking down speech restrictions that may be justified by their unique
factual or social context”); Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in
First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 388 (2009) (drawing attention to a variety of low-value categories that reflect a balancing of values); David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection
of Self-Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 85–86 (2012) (discussing why the
historically linked approach is “fundamentally illusory” and contrary to balancing methodologies the Court relied on to find obscenity and fighting words were
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that controversy, the leeway Morse, Fraser, and Hazelwood
granted administrators to decide what is substantially disruptive allows for “startling and dangerous” administrative decisions to be made to suppress speech because of its message.135
Student speech is conspicuously missing from the lists of
low-value speech proffered in Stevens, Entertainment Merchants
Association, and Alvarez. Indeed, the Court’s reliance on strict
scrutiny in Entertainment Merchants Association to vindicate
adolescents’ ability to partake in expressive conduct confirms
that, outside of schools, the First Amendment protects youths’
First Amendment rights.136 Communication within schools has
never explicitly been found to be a low-value speech; indeed
Tinker signaled that student speech should be taken seriously
and constitutionally protected for its valuable contribution to political discourse and the marketplace of ideas. But the erosion of
the test for substantial disruption—which after Morse has effectively deferred to school officials’ decisions to suppress an ad hoc
list of student communications, 137 even about matters of political
and social importance—has de facto treated student communications as a new category of low-value speech. This is a curious
result because fundamental rights are not lost at school, rather
extra disciplinary authority reflects the need to prevent disruption of education, not a justification for viewpoint suppression
about matters even as controversial as drug use or school administration. The Court’s formalistic methodology leaves little room
for nuanced judicial weighing of factors such as student age, educational values, and pedagogical concerns. Instead, the Court
has been lax in its review of student speech cases. As a result,
administrators now enjoy extensive latitude to discipline students for even core political speech.

outside of First Amendment protection); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional
Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1652 (2005) (“In a striking number of cases the Court has forgotten the reasons
behind particular rules and has come to treat them as nothing more than statements of constitutional requirements. This . . . distorts the relationship the
Court has to other governmental actors and to the American people.”).
135. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2554.
136. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799–801 (2011) (requiring government to prove up a restriction on children’s speech using the
strict scrutiny standard).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 101–03.
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B. MORSE’S IMPACT ON STUDENT SPEECH
Recent lower court decisions have grappled with the analytical divide between Morse and Tinker. Several of them have
adopted a categorical rejection of free speech claims in favor of
administrative efficiency. For half a century, there has been a
consensus that public school students enjoy First Amendment
protections. Insofar as student speech is political and not materially disruptive or substantially disorderly, one would anticipate rigorous judicial scrutiny of school districts’ restrictions on
student expression. Morse, Fraser, and Hazelwood eroded the
safeguards of Tinker, categorically rejecting student speech
claims rather than balancing them against school governance
thereby allowing school officials to rely on an ad hoc sense of content-based propriety to censor students. The determination of
whether student speech is about a public matter, lewd, embarrassing to other students and their parents, or supportive of
crime is now largely left to superintendents, principals, and
teachers. Judicial deference to their judgments has relegated
many types of valuable student conversations to the same rational basis level of scrutiny as those 2 categories listed in Stevens, Entertainment Merchants, and Alvarez as outside the First
Amendment ambit.
In choosing to defer to school administrators, as in Morse,
rather than engage in heightened scrutiny analysis, as in Tinker,
courts have created a de facto low-value speech category that impacts student communications both inside and outside schools.
Following Morse and treating student speech as low value creates problems, specifically because it provides significant disciplinary latitude to punish children for offensive communications; expands the disciplinary reach of schools; and allows for
increased administrative censorship. This provides the significant disciplinary latitude to punish children for offensive communications. Yet, the Court has recognized the inherent ambiguity of using a patently offensive standard, since many people
take offense at political statements and social commentary. 138
The First Amendment is implicated by granting administrators

138. See Frederick v. Morse, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007) (“Petitioners urge us
to adopt the broader rule that Frederick’s speech is proscribable because it is
plainly ‘offensive’ as that term is used in Fraser. We think this stretches Fraser
too far; that case should not be read to encompass any speech that could fit
under some definition of ‘offensive.’ After all, much political and religious speech
might be perceived as offensive to some.”).
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nearly unlimited ad hoc discretion about what constitutes a reasonable disciplinary measure, and in its most recent cases the
Court has allowed for a loosely defined pedagogical concern to
trump student free expression. Contextual adjudication, not categorical deference to school authorities, is necessary in this area
because student dialogue on controversial issues is so important
to children’s civic and personal improvements. Without more
stringent protections, students are chilled from openly discussing matters such as abortion, divorce, and illegal drugs. This effectively stymies student voices, and it is likely to suppress student engagement, development, and deliberation.
The Morse majority’s reliance on speculative rational basis
review has created a de facto low-value speech category that impacts student communications both inside and outside schools.
Morse bolstered the interpretive status of appellate cases that
upheld disciplinary measures rendered against students who
made offensive statements off campus.139 Prior to Morse, speech
outside school, even lewd gestures directed at a teacher, had
been deemed constitutionally protected and beyond the control
of school disciplinarians. 140 For instance, when materials inadvertently appeared on campus—in one case because the writer’s
younger brother took to school a composition depicting a violent
siege—a court found any school inconvenience to educational
discipline was outweighed by the values of free speech. 141 This
form of balancing has now given way in many jurisdictions to
categorical rejection of student claims.

139. Prior to Morse there was a judicial uncertainty about how to review
cases of student speech occurring off campus but subsequently brought into the
school. See Sullivan v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1075–77 (5th Cir.
1973) (holding that school authorities could censure the sale within and near
school of an underground student newspaper, not sanctioned by the school, containing an expletive against education); Sullivan v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 307
F. Supp. 1328, 1333–35 (S.D. Tex. 1969) supplemented, 333 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D.
Tex. 1971) vacated, 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973) (additional facts).
140. See, e.g., Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441–42 (D. Me. 1986) (finding student could not be disciplined for lewd gesture made outside school);
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo.1998)
(holding that student was likely to succeed on a First Amendment claim for material derogatory statements about school administration that were posted on
student’s personal Internet page).
141. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir.
2004) (“Given the unique facts of the present case, we decline to find that
Adam’s drawing constitutes student speech on the school premises. Adam’s
drawing was completed in his home, stored for two years, and never intended
by him to be brought to campus.”).
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The holding in Morse, in favor of the school principal’s decision to suspend a student for his presumed viewpoint about marijuana, signaled an increased tolerance for administrative censorship. By upholding the principal’s decision to suspend, the
majority in effect indicated lower courts had been mistaken that
Tinker prohibited viewpoint discrimination. 142 Morse, in fact, appears to have modified the standard from Tinker, offering
schools greater powers to control student messages with negligible judicial oversight.
Furthermore, Tinker required judges to carefully evaluate
the contextual circumstances to determine whether students
were engaged in the fundamental right of self-expression and
then balancing it against the reasonable need for the school to
maintain order. 143 This flexible model for judicial analysis differs
from the categorical requirements of the Stevens line of cases. 144
Tinker held that:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that
its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. 145

Whereas in Morse, the Court allowed a principal to treat an unpopular message as if it were outside the ambit of the First
Amendment, without any show of disruption. Some lower courts
have likewise relied on administrative decision makers, without
subjecting disciplinary decisions to careful scrutiny.
In this Section, I trace some of the most impactful recent
developments in the school speech context, which have degraded
political, social, and artistic student speech below the level of
constitutionally protected expression. In some cases, courts have
given lip-service to the Tinker formula while countenancing punishments for expressing views on school grounds or off of them,
making it seem that Tinker’s most famous principle, that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the school house door,” 146 has been much
142. For a prior case arguing that Tinker applied to viewpoint discrimination, see Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 430 (9th Cir. 2008).
143. I based this statement from a variety of pre-Morse cases asserting that
Tinker requires judges to engage in totality of the circumstances analyses. See
Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 768 (9th Cir. 2006); LaVine v.
Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001); Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d
171, 174 (9th Cir. 1973).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 123–34.
145. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
146. Id. at 506.
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eroded by later jurisprudence, especially Morse. The effect has
been to qualify student speech protections to a point analogous
to the low value categories listed in the Stevens line of cases. 147
1. On-campus Speech

In a case illustrative of the increasingly deferential judicial
track, Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District, 148 a circuit court upheld school administrators’ decision to repress political student speech. The principal and assistant principal of a
Northern California high school had ordered the student body
not to wear U.S. flags in a prominent place during a Cinco de
Mayo celebration. Dianna Dariano was among a small group of
students who arrived in school on that festive date wearing images of the flag. 149 Worried a racial skirmish might ensue, the
principal and assistant principal directed them to either turn
their shirts inside out or to leave school with an excused absence. 150 Dariano’s mom pulled her from school, but two other
students chose to cover the flag and return to class. 151 In addition, students with less prominently displayed flag logos on their
clothes were also allowed to return to class. 152
At trial, administrators explained that they had acted to
quell the student protest for fear that their demonstrative display of the U.S. flag at a celebration of Mexican history could
incited violence.153 Their assessment of the circumstances was
based on the school’s history of ethnic violence. During the previous six years, thirty racial fights between Hispanic and Caucasian students had occurred at the high school. 154 However, on
the day of Dariano’s flag protest no physical altercations took
place; indeed, she had only been subject to mild verbal taunting
about her patriotic display. 155
There was no reason for the court to treat the flag display as
a low-value form of speech. To the contrary, Dariano’s display
was clearly meant to be a political statement, similar to the black
armband used by students in Tinker. Nothing in the record
147. See supra text accompanying notes 105–07, 119–40.
148. Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014).
149. Id. at 764.
150. Id.
151. Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1039
(N.D. Cal. 2011).
152. Id.
153. Dariano, 767 F 3d. at 778.
154. Id. at 774.
155. Id.
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demonstrated the administration’s claim that wearing a flag was
immediately likely to trigger a fight. 156 Neither did anyone
threaten Dariano with any menacing word of gestures. 157 She
was merely subject to razzing, so ordinary at high schools. Even
though her wearing a flag decal fit into no historically and traditionally accepted category of unprotected speech, the school administration acted to suppress her message. And the Ninth Circuit countenanced this censorship without requiring the school
to present proof of substantial educational disruption. Administrators exploited the ambiguity of recent school speech cases,
treating the matter as only requiring rational basis review.158
Dariano was a glaring departure from Tinker analysis; indeed, it was closely aligned to the categorical dismissal of student speech as being of low value and not warranting stringent
First Amendment protections. The trial court deferred to school
officials’ decision to suppress the American flag in order to prevent an as-yet unplanned and unformulated disruption.159 Rather than protecting the messenger, officials favored those who
wished her message to be silenced. The court gave greater
weight to the demands of the silencer than the expression of Dariano. This was a diametrical opposite approach to the one announced in Tinker, but much in line with Morse. In Tinker, the
Supreme Court had found insufficient the school’s claim that it
had the discretion to deny students the right to express their political points of view because “[o]utside the classrooms, a few students made hostile remarks to the children wearing armbands,
but there were no threats or acts of violence on school premises.” 160 In Dariano, to the contrary, the circuit court believed
the negative remarks made to students wearing the flag decal—

156. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 408 (1992) (White, J., concurring)
(asserting that the fighting words doctrine concerns “a class of speech that conveys an overriding message of personal injury and imminent violence”).
157. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2027 (2015) (relying on a
scienter framework to analyze a federal statute prohibiting threats from being
conveyed through interstate communications media).
158. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct 2218, 2231 (2015).
159. See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 779 (9th
Cir. 2014) (“Here, both the specific events . . . and the pattern of which those
events were a part made it reasonable for school officials to proceed as though
the threat of a potentially violent disturbance was real”); Dariano v. Unified
Sch. Dist., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1045 (2011) (“[T]he Court finds that based on
these undisputed facts, the school officials reasonably forecast that Plaintiffs’
clothing could cause a substantial disruption with school activities.”).
160. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
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“Why are you wearing that? Do you not like Mexicans?” 161—provided the school with reason to reasonably believe violence might
ensue and therefore to halt the messengers from traversing the
facilities. 162 School officials could have understood those two
questions as starting points for moderated dialogue between the
opposing factions of students. Without any disruption at school,
the principal and assistant principal lacked objective indicia for
shutting down the messengers.
Relying on other students’ warnings (such as, a comment to
the assistant principal that, “You may want to go out to the quad
area. There might be some—there might be some issues”) 163 and
a past history of fights, officials impeded Dariano and her group
from displaying their political message during the school’s celebration of Cinco de Mayo. The court engaged in no more than
rational basis review, despite the strict scrutiny protections political speech ordinarily receives. In a school environment, the
Tinker standard would have been appropriate for deciding the
conflict because the message was political and deliberative; 164
instead, the court adopted the lowest level of scrutiny, allowing
for administrator speculation to gainsay student self-expression.
In effect, the court empowered school officials to act on a “heckler’s veto.” 165 Rather than treating the flag t-shirt as a symbol
protected under the First Amendment, the court used only minimum judicial oversight and, thereby, allowed school staff to define a low-value category and to rely on it to the student
speaker’s detriment. Rather than exactingly scrutinizing the
constitutionality of suppressing a political message, the circuit
court enabled school administrators to act on a category of patriotic symbols they believed might lead to violence. That is too
plastic and inchoate a standard to safeguard the high constitutional stakes of the case.
In a separate district court case from a different appellate
circuit than Dariano, the judge likewise treated commentary on
a public issue as if it were low-level speech along the Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse line of cases, rather than invoking the robust
protections of Tinker. J.A. v. Fort Wayne Community School
161. See, e.g., Dariano, 767 F.3d at 767.
162. Id. at 777.
163. Id. at 767.
164. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989) (“ The very purpose of a national flag is to serve as a symbol of our country.”).
165. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997) (rejecting
the use of a heckler ’s veto to censor expression).
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arose when school officials prohibited a high school student, J.A.,
from wearing a bracelet with the inscription, “I <3 boobies. (Keep
a Breast).” 166 J.A.’s communicative conduct violated the school
rule barring that specific message from being worn in school. 167
School administrators instituted the policy because they deemed
the terminology to be “offensive to women and inappropriate for
school wear,” having previously received a complaint about a single male student wearing the bracelet and harassing a female
student. 168 J.A. explained to officials that her mother, who was
a breast cancer survivor, gave her the bracelet, and that she
wore it at school to raise awareness about the disease.169 The
school’s censorship was not limited to substantially disruptive
speech, which would have been a legitimate exercise of school
authority under Tinker, but stifled J.A.’s social advocacy based
on an overbroadly defined category of vulgarity. The slogan originated with the creator of the bracelet, Keep a Breast Foundation.170
In upholding the school policy, the court gave inadequate
consideration to Tinker, citing it only in passing, for the pro
forma principle that students retain free speech rights. 171 The
bulk of the opinion defers to school authority, even though at issue was explicit content and viewpoint discrimination. 172
Thereby, the court treated a statement raising awareness about
a serious health matter as if it was a form of low-value speech,
such as might have been listed by the Court in Stevens, enjoying
no First Amendment protection, and treated under the rational
basis standard.173 Rather than giving any substantial weight to
the student’s argument and rigorously examining her legal
claims, the court relied on Fraser’s recognition that administrators can prohibit vulgar and lewd expressions.174 The district
court judge ignored the clear difference between the “explicit sex-

166. No. 1:12-CV-155JVB, 2013 WL 4479229, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 20, 2013).
167. Id. at *1
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at *2.
172. See id. at *2–7.
173. Id. at *3 (“Giving appropriate deference to schools requires courts to
review school determinations by asking whether an objective observer could
reasonably interpret the slogan as lewd, vulgar, obscene, or plainly offensive.”).
174. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986).

2018]

CATEGORIZING STUDENT SPEECH

1177

ual metaphor” used by the student at a school sponsored assembly in Fraser, 175 and the clearly health-related message in the
case before it.176
The court openly discounted the First Amendment value of
J.A.’s speech. It acknowledged that the bracelet contained “commentary [about] social or political issues,” 177 which might have
been expected to elicit some form of heightened scrutiny. In addition, the court entirely discounted a critical factor of the Tinker
test by deeming it irrelevant that the school conceded the bracelet caused no substantial disruption. 178 Nevertheless, the court
illogically treated the matter as if it involved communication unworthy of constitutional protection, as if a statement about
women’s healthcare were similar to obscenity. School officials
were only required to demonstrate that based on their professional assessment of the student’s “age, maturity, and other
characteristics” they were better able to decide whether to suppress ideas than judges. 179 That standard is unobjective, prone
to school officials’ subjective error, and chilling of student
speech. Deference to school administrators even led the judge to
adopt a very questionable school characterization of a phrase as
lewd that the student wore to raise cancer awareness, even
though it was clearly linked to treatment of a life-threatening
disease. 180 With First Amendment rights at stake, the district
court’s approach shifted the duty to interpret the Constitution
from the judiciary to school administrators.
The Supreme Court’s weakening of student speech in cases
like Fraser and Morse to a lower value speech category, which
can be abridged, even absent any clear proof of substantial disruption or interference with education, has led to inconsistent
holdings. In B.H. v. Easton Area School District, the Third Circuit addressed the constitutionality of suppressing the identical
message, “I <3 boobies! (KEEP A BREAST),” as the one found to
be unprotected speech in J.A. 181 In B.H., middle school girls wore
bracelets with that message at school.182 The Third Circuit held

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
J.A., 2013 WL 4479229, at *1.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *7.
See id. at *1, *7.
B.H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 297–98 (3d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 298–99.
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that the message was not plainly lewd.183 The en banc court recognized that the danger of school officials acting capriciously by
simply invoking “a parade of horribles” would allow school officials to suppress political and social comments on the basis of
protecting students against “ambiguously lewd speech.” 184 Relying on the officials’ slippery slope argument, “schools could eliminate all student speech touching on sex or merely having the
potential to offend.” 185 The bracelet did not even contain a swear
word.186 Unlike the J.A. court, the Third Circuit carefully parsed
Tinker in light of later Supreme Court holdings for the proposition that administrators can limit student speech to prevent disruption from lewd or profane speech, illegal drug use advocacy,
or disruption of pedagogy. 187 The school did not provide evidence
warranting deference for any of those three concerns.188
2. Off-Campus Speech
Several courts have also treated social commentary students made off campus as unprotected and subject to the disciplinary authority of school officials. Some lower courts have interpreted Morse to grant school administrators great latitude for
sanctioning categories of communications outside the confines of
school. Even if we were to accept the holding in Morse, rejecting
the criticism I leveled against it earlier in this article, 189 the case
should be limited to school-sponsored activities, not extended to
speech made outside and then accessed inside educational institutions.190
Before the digital age, the demarcation between home and
school were self-evident. The Internet has enabled students to
create messages at home and to direct them to the entire student
body. With the expansion of the Internet’s domain into high
schools and grade schools, courts have grappled with how to
characterize postings made at the students’ homes or elsewhere
183. Id. at 320.
184. Id. at 317.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 297–98. For a list of so-called infamous “filthy words,” see FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978).
187. Id. at 304 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683
(1986); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)).
188. See id. at 303–07.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 77–91.
190. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 (“Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a
public forum outside the school context, it would have been protected.”).
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outside the school property and only later streamed on-campus.
The digital complexity of determining whether the complaint
arises on campus or off is evident from a Second Circuit case,
Doninger v. Niehoff, involving the alleged violation by high
school administrators of a student’s First Amendment rights.191
Avery Doninger and several of her fellow students posted an
initial e-mail from the high school’s computer lab, voicing disgruntlement about an administrative decision to delay an upcoming school concert, called Jamfest. 192 The school principal
then asked Doninger to retract a mistake in the text of that message; instead, Doninger posted an anti-administration blogpost
from home. 193 The post appeared on an independent, private
website, calling for student activism to convince the school principal and superintendent to host the event without excessive delay. 194
The court found the post to be vulgar, even though the only
statements approaching vulgarity were the student’s provocatively telling readers “to piss [the principal] off more” and calling
persons at the central office a lewd appellation, “douchebags.” 195
Although the offending statements were uploaded from a private
computer, as part of a call for collective action on a matter impacting students’ lives, the court deferred to administrators’
judgments—as if the statements were of low value rather than
as calls for social and political activism. 196 The district court had
found that punishing the student for speech made off campus
would have a chilling effect on her future e-mail and blog communications. 197 That finding did not, however, lead the court to
use heightened scrutiny, despite the school’s obvious censure of
content. 198

191. 527 F.3d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2008).
192. Id. at 44.
193. Id. at 45.
194. Id.; Brief of Amicus Curiae, ACLU of Connecticut, in Support of Plaintiff ’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction at 1,
Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007) (No. 3:07-cv-1129
(MRK)) (stating that the student created the blog post from home).
195. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45–46.
196. See id. at 53.
197. Id. at 47.
198. See id. at 47–53.
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The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s refusal to
issue an injunction against the school, finding Doninger was unlikely to prevail in her First Amendment complaint. 199 The holding sanctioned the administrators’ punishment of a student who
had passionately expressed opposition about the timing of a
school event. The court of appeals empowered the school to prevent her from expressing a contrarian viewpoint on a matter affecting a large segment of the student population.
While the Second Circuit couched its holding in Tinker’s
recognition of school officials’ need to prevent substantial disruptions of school discipline,200 the holding countenanced a chilling
of student speech on an important community matter. The lewd
label blinded the court to any deep analysis of the context in
which the blog posts were made, the location of the electronic
transactions, the school politics involved, and other nuanced topics that should have played a role in the decision. The court ruled
that school officials could silence speech posted on an off-campus
computer, when officials could reasonably foresee the message
reaching school and being likely to create a disruption. 201 The
foreseeability approach countenances school officials’ speculative assessment of risks posed by speech made outside the institution, indicating that the court has now undervalued the message’s significance to core First Amendment interests: personal
activism, political empowerment, and information dissemination.
In fact, the court of appeals in Doninger could identify little
disruption of school work, much less any substantial disruption,
other than a couple of students commenting on the blog posting
and a “deluge of calls and emails” to the school superintendent
and principal, who admonished offending students during the
morning class period. 202 The court’s rationale upholds the suppression of controversial ideas for an administratively created
disruption in student classes. The circuit court found it sufficient
that officials perceived Doninger’s communications to be “potentially disruptive of efforts to resolve the ongoing controversy.” 203

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 50–51.
Id.
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The court found it consequential that the student’s statements were “at best misleading and at wors[t] false.” 204 This justification for stifling speech run counter to the Supreme Court’s
finding that in matters involving public controversies, public officials, and public speakers, the Constitution protects the value
of even false statements that are not asserted maliciously or in
reckless disregard for the truth. 205 While analysis in the school
setting differs, where a student makes controversial, and sometimes misleading, statements outside school that by themselves
do not harm education, it is convincing to believe that “[e]ven a
false statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution
to public debate, since it brings about ‘the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.’” 206
While the student used wording inappropriate for the classroom, on balance the utterance in question was part of a broader
communication that was relevant to the student body, occurred
off campus, and constituted social activism. Her speech should
not have been treated like a low value category; instead, it
should have received heightened judicial scrutiny. Doninger participated with other students in collective expression in an effort
to organize nonviolent protest opposing the decision of school administrators, which was an exercise of free speech.
In another case recognizing the right of schools to punish
out-of-school speech, the Fourth Circuit reviewed a high school
student’s suspension for posting a message under the heading,
“S.A.S.H.,” which stood for “Students Against Sluts Herpes.” 207
The target of that acronym was a fellow student, Shay N.208 The
poster, Kara Kowalski, invited 100 people to view and participate in group posts deriding Shay. School administrators subsequently suspended Kowalski for ten days and prevented her
from being crowned to the elected office of Queen of Charm. Despite the expressive event having occurred off campus and not
204. Id. at 51.
205. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (“ The
constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.”).
206. Id. at 279 n.19, (quoting J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (R. B. McCallum ed.,
1946)).
207. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011).
208. Id.
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having disrupted schoolwork, the court found the punishment
did not violate Tinker’s First Amendment immunities. 209 The
circuit court seems to have authorized school authorities in the
Fourth Circuit to suspend students for comments made about
their colleagues almost anywhere and anytime.
A separate case from the Third Circuit also dealt with student comments made off campus, J.S. v. Blue Mountain School
District, also considered whether school officials could take adverse action based on reasonable anticipation of substantial educational disruption. 210 However, the outcome was very different
than the laxer treatment of free speech in the Second and Fourth
Circuits. In J.S., one weekend two students used the personal
computer of a parent to create a fallacious MySpace account,
purporting the webpage to have been made by the middle school
principal. 211 The profile contained “nonsense and juvenile humor” with sexual vulgarity and profanity, including claims that
the principal engaged in child abuse and bestiality. 212 At first
the profile was public, but the day after creating it J.S. made
access to it private to twenty-two friends. 213 As a consequence,
the principal suspended J.S. from school for ten days.
The principal certainly could have brought a common law
defamation suit, but was school action constitutionally permissible? The school district proffered evidence demonstrating that
students discussed the profile at school, creating a minor disturbance in the math class that involved six or seven students
speaking about the profile in the middle of a lesson. 214 The Third
Circuit found the school had failed to meet its evidentiary burden of showing that these “rumblings” rose to a predictable and
substantial disruption standard articulated in Tinker.215 That
landmark case had received only perfunctory treatment in Doninger and Kowalski. The Third Circuit carefully compared the
facts in Tinker to those in the record on appeal. The Tinker Court
found the students’ use of the armband to be protected form of
speech despite the predictably upsetting nature of the opposition
to the Vietnam War. 216 Comparatively, J.S.’s crass profile did not
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 572.
J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 928 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 920.
Id.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 923.
Id. at 928–29.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 560 (1969).
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even name the principal, nor the location of his school.217 Hence,
the Third Circuit determined that the Tinker precedent did not
justify the suspension in this case.218
III. STUDENTS AS CITIZENS AND PEOPLE
Lower court decisions evince the jurisprudential uncertainty that is the byproduct of Fraser’s, Morse’s, and Hazelwood’s departure from the rigorous protection of student free
speech articulated by the Supreme Court in Tinker. Resolution
of the recent circuit splits discussed in Part II requires the theoretical guidance of a contextual framework for evaluating school
regulations that impose a substantial burden on student communications. Judges should probe issues such as (1) whether
school officials restricted students’ expressions because of the
content or viewpoint of the message; (2) whether the censorship
stifled speech that has been historically regarded within or extrinsic to free speech values of citizens, including young citizens;
(3) whether the student speech advanced deliberation, education, debate, acculturation, and so on; (4) whether the policy and
punishment—be it suspension, expulsion, or a trip to the principal’s office—was narrowly tailored to the stated purpose; and (5)
whether any less onerous limitations were available without stifling communications. Unlike the categorical approach, balancing parties’ interests allows for a contextual evaluation for the
nuanced resolution of conflicts between students’ right to expression and administrators’ obligation to maintain discipline.
This part of the Article proffers a tiered approach. Speech
interests are not all identical. Contrary to the premises of the
absolutist approach, not all content restrictions are as averse to
First Amendment values as others. Political speech is at the core
of the First Amendment 219 but incitement is not even protected
by the Constitution. 220 When student speech is about politics,
personal development, or the expansion of knowledge, judges
should apply a strict scrutiny analysis, unless it disrupts educational programs. In circumstances where limitations on students’ expression are created to advance certain neutral time,
place, and manner concerns, the intermediate scrutiny standard
217. J.S., 650 F.3d at 920.
218. Id. at 929–30.
219. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (asserting that “lawful political speech” is “at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect”).
220. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002).
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is appropriate. Finally, courts faced with cases involving speech
with a low First Amendment threshold of importance—such as
defamation, true threats, and fallacy—should defer to school officials’ expertise, unless they are enforced for arbitrary reasons.
School interests are at their apogee when administrators
seek to punish communications outside the purview of the First
Amendment, such as incitement, copyright violations, or defamations, and student interests are at their highest when they
want to exercise core First Amendment values, such as politicking, artistry, or informativeness. Contextual analysis is critical
to proportional analysis, requiring judges to weigh competing interests. Courts should be most deferential to students when they
seek to achieve core constitutional rights.
In some circumstances, school authority extends beyond the
categories announced in the Stevens line of cases. The balancing
approach recognizes that cases giving rise to more than one constitutional concern require proportionate scrutiny of all pertinent law, not an automatic presumption in favor of free speech.
Part III.C illustrates this point by balancing interests of students wanting to display Confederate symbols while at school
against officials’ authority to fulfill the Thirteenth Amendment’s
obligation to prevent displays of the badges of slavery and involuntary servitude, such as Confederate flags.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTUALIZATION
The Supreme Court countenances limitations on high school
students’ expressive liberties that would otherwise be deemed
unconstitutional if they were imposed on adults. Fleeting profanity, advocacy of illegal drug use, and journalism about reproduction are expressions whose contents, when uttered by adults,
cannot be repressed absent a compelling government interest
and narrow tailoring. But as demonstrated in Parts I and II,
school administrators prohibit all these types of speech.221 The
Court’s recent categorical deference to school officials chills students who wish to express unorthodox or offensive ideas. Indeed,
the degree of deference the Court gives to school administrative
decision makers fails to exercise the judiciary’s role of identifying
what constitutes protected speech.

221. See supra Parts I, II.
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Courts typically take student vulnerability for granted as a
justification for school restrictions, 222 creating categories deferential to authorities without adequately balancing them with the
compelling constitutional interests in expression. Given the
pragmatic needs of classrooms, part of the educator’s role is to
maintain order, disallowing and punishing the use of vulgarities,
insults, and other forms of harassing distractions. Where students substantially and disruptively interfere with others’ learning experiences, teachers have a substantial interest in censoring the manner and timing of outbursts. It is reasonable to
expect younger learners to have different sensibilities than older
high school students. Nevertheless, the First Amendment protects the ability to engage in political discussions irrespective of
age. Classrooms and school auditoria are interactive forums
where teachers direct education but leave space for students to
develop civic consciousness by respectful expressions of sincerely
held beliefs and ideas. So too, self-expression through art and
humor are important for persons of all ages. Education at the
grade school and high school levels traditionally drives students
to discuss subjects with greater degrees of sophistication as they
grow older, formulate opinions through close examinations of
topics, dispel false information by open conversation, and learn
more about themselves.
A categorical approach that relies on age as a determinant
of what speech is protected in classrooms and school hallways
gives insufficient weight to the extent to which grade schools and
high schools function as part of the cultural milieu of civic development. The exercise of free speech has personal and social value
at all levels of human development, from childhood to adulthood.
As things stand, courts all too often find permissible restrictions
burdening the expression of students’ viewpoints. 223 The categorical method of adjudication discounts factors critical to the
preservation of a flourishing learning environment conducive to
student civic growth. A tiered approach to review school speech
regulations will better protect students’ abilities to participate
at school as citizens of a deliberative democracy, while giving
222. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988)
(discussing school officials’ expertise in identifying the emotional maturity of
students); L.L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of Educ., 141 F. Supp. 3d 288, 296 (D.N.J.
2015) (asserting that students are particularly vulnerability to harassment).
223. See, e.g., Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926
(10th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e conclude that Hazelwood allows educators to make viewpoint-based decisions about school-sponsored speech.”).
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principals and teachers enough discretion in classrooms and during other school events.
To some degree, the treatment of student speech should be
informed by the judicial treatment of public employees. 224
Though not entirely symmetrical, pertinent analytical similarities exist between the two contexts. For example, using swearwords can be grounds for adverse action against public employees 225 without violating the First Amendment, just as it can
against a student.226 Schools do not even violate the First
Amendment for firing adult employees who advocate that students ingest stimulants,227 but it is quite another thing to fire
teachers who abstractly support the legalization of narcotics.
Furthermore, where public employees make statements of public
concern outside the employment setting, employers cannot reprimand them for disrupting the workplace, for undermining discipline, or for harming harmonious employee interaction. 228 Student off-campus speech should likewise be treated as a matter
for private concern when it does not substantially interfere with
school discipline, teaching, and ordinary pedagogical functions.
The analogy is, however, inexact despite the similarities between students and public university employees; universities
are not mandated to retain untenured employees,229 and employees can quit whether or not they pursue alternative employment. 230 Underage students, however, are statutorily required

224. See Nicole B. Cásarez, The Student Press, the Public Workplace, and
Expanding Notions of Government Speech, 35 J.C. & U.L. 1, 7–26 (2008) (expounding on the “extent to which the First Amendment protects speech by public school students on one hand, and public employees on the other, has developed along strikingly similar lines”).
225. Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 584–86 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding an employee has no First Amendment right to use profanity in the classroom and comparing the decision to terminate to the school’s decision in Fraser).
226. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
227. Schul v. Sherard, 102 F. Supp. 2d 877, 886 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (finding
that high school’s interest in terminating an employee who promoted the use of
caffeine among student athletes exceeded free speech interests of the offending
coach).
228. Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 569–70, 572–73 (1968).
229. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 76 (3d ed. 2005)
(“ The American rule is that oral contracts of indefinite duration (the most common form of employment contract) are presumed to be ‘at will’ contracts.”).
230. The Thirteenth Amendment of United States prohibits forced labor.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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to attend schools for a legally defined number of years. 231 And
students are not unionized, while public employees bargain collectively and strike, which in the case of teacher unions can
cause disruptions in education. 232
Despite asymmetries, the Court’s public employee balancing
doctrine can also be pertinent to the adjudication of disputes between school disciplinarians wanting to punish a perceived infraction and students seeking to communicate controversial
messages to others at and outside school. The free speech value
of giving students adequate latitude to express themselves creatively, politically, and descriptively coincides with the value of
public employee expressions on those subjects. In neither case is
the Free Speech Clause an absolute. In those circumstances
when students and employees do not speak as citizens but respectively as learners or public agents, the state can place reasonable limitations on them without violating the First Amendment. This suggested mode of analysis does not subject either
category of speaker to the low rigor scrutiny that the Court relied
on in Morse, Hazelwood, and Fraser. Instead, it requires nuanced adjudication of conflicting state and private interests.
Rather than periodically treating student speech as a lowvalue category warranting only ad hoc balancing and rational
basis review, adjudication should be treated as part of a continuum. All relevant factors—speech and administrative—should
be reviewed and reflected in the judgment. This will inevitably
boil down to contextual adjudication that takes into account general First Amendment doctrine, free speech principles, as well as
the particular circumstances of speech limitations—arising during classwork, school politics, informal conversations, hallway
banter, composition, classrooms, recess, and so forth. The peculiar setting of primary and secondary schools will require some
balance of free speech and pedagogy which are typically not pertinent with public employees, but concerns for education should
not be excuses for the suppression of controversial ideas.
Contexualization is a form of balancing that should include
considerations of whether the student expression is protected by
core First Amendment values. For example, students who speak
231. John R. Bunker, Check-Out Time at the Hotel California, 11 ST. JOHN’S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 137, 146 (1995) (providing citations to all fifty states’ compulsory school laws).
232. See Randall W. Eberts & Joe A. Stone, Teachers Unions and the Productivity of Public Schools, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 354, 361 (1987); Peggie R.
Smith, Laboring for Child Care: A Consideration of New Approaches to Represent Low-Income Service Workers, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 583, 603–04 (2006).
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of politics engage in conversations that help them grow as citizens.233 And suppression of this form of expression—whether it
concerns national, state, or school topics—would be particularly
suspect because of the social value of civic participation and its
relation to representative governance. On the other hand, it is
within the power of administrators to discipline students for intentionally violent or threatening statements which intrude the
educational interests of students and pedagogues. Even where
restrictions are justifiable under certain circumstances that pose
a substantial disruption of schooling, the selected disciplinary
measure should not be categorical but narrowly tailored to address a pressing educational concern. A court would do better
independently to engage in a sophisticated analysis of these factors, rather than reflexively relying on the expertise of school
disciplinarians. Balancing considerations are relevant no matter
which of the three traditional forms of scrutiny are applicable to
a case. 234 Nevertheless, administrators should have a more difficult threshold to clear in cases involving core speech about such
matters as elections and an easier one where suspect expressions, such as class bullying or ethnic slurs, are of little, if any,
educational value.

233. See Joseph E. Kahne & Susan E. Sporte, Developing Citizens: The Impact of Civic Learning Opportunities on Students’ Commitment to Civic Participation, 45 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 738 (2008) (describing an empirical study to prove
that civic learning opportunities in high school improve students’ attitudes
about civic involvement); Josh Pasek et al., Schools as Incubators of Democratic
Participation: Building Long-Term Political Efficacy with Civic Education, 12
APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 26, 26 (2008) (providing empirical support proving the effectiveness of high school on political socialization and suggesting the
use of more targeted civic education).
234. See Richard C. Ausness, The Application of Product Liability Principles
to Publishers of Violent or Sexually Explicit Material, 52 FLA. L. REV. 603, 641
(2000) (“[C]ourts will normally uphold restrictions, or even complete prohibitions, of low-value speech as long as the government can show a rational basis
for its actions.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, A Grand Theory of Constitutional Law?,
100 MICH. L. REV. 1249, 1249 n.5 (2002) (reviewing JEB RUBENFELD, FREEDOM
AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001)) (“I see
strict scrutiny as a form of balancing, with the weights on the scales being set
against the government’s action.”); Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When
Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 676–77 (2008)
(“[I]ntermediate scrutiny expressly balances the government’s interests against
the free speech interests at stake.”); Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach
to Protecting Speech in American Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L. J. 917, 919
(2009) (“Strict scrutiny can be seen as a form of balancing, but with a very strong
thumb on the scale in favor of the speech interest.”).
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B. CONTEXTUALIZING STUDENT SPEECH: THE NEED FOR STRICT
SCRUTINY WHEN STUDENT SPEECH IS ABOUT POLITICS,
PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT, OR THE EXPANSION OF KNOWLEDGE
Students are civic and self-expressive players who contribute to the interpersonal life of schools by engaging classmates
and teachers in political, social, artistic, and informative conversations. Under ordinary circumstances, courts review limits on
the content of speech using strict scrutiny judicial review. 235
While the school environment is a distinct setting for the exchange of ideas and experiences,236 student access to views and
ideas allows them to be active and effective participants in pluralist society, local communities, student organizations, and
many other formal and informal associations.237 In practical
terms, this means that schools should be subject to strict scrutiny analysis in cases where students are denied access to information, such as when authorities remove books from library
shelves perceived to be not in keeping with “orthodox” views “in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”238
In educational settings, application of the strict scrutiny test
requires some contextualization.239 A judge must ascertain (1)
235. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S.Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015) (relying on
strict scrutiny to uphold a state bar rule against judicial candidates personally
soliciting campaign funds); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55
(1988) (finding that even outrageous “political and social discourse” is constitutionally protected form of viewpoint); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 188–89
(1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the informative function of the
press enjoys First Amendment protections). Courts rely on the strict scrutiny
test to identify whether a content-based restriction on speech is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).
236. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(reviewing First Amendment considerations “in light of the special characteristics of the school environment”).
237. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982) (asserting that access to information “prepares students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious
society in which they will soon be adult members.”).
238. Id. at 872 (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).
239. Stated more broadly, students have a right to gain meaningful information without arbitrary school censorship. That is, there’s a difference between lesson plans formulated to be appropriate for students of a particular age
and the suppression of ideas triggered by the suppression of information. This
opens an important topic on the audience implications for students to the “right
to receive ideas,” which is too much afield of this article but will need to be
parsed at greater length in future work. See id. at 867 (“[T]he right to receive
ideas follows ineluctably from the sender ’s First Amendment right to send
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whether administrators censored information to suppress a
viewpoint; (2) whether the regulation is of a type that is customarily imposed for pedagogical purposes; (3) whether allowing students to discuss the controversial ideas would advance their deliberative skills; (4) whether punishment was needed to advance
education; and (5) whether something less onerous—such as discussion or debate—could have been imposed instead of suppression of speech. All these considerations are meant to balance society’s interest in education with a student’s right to access and
disseminate information. 240
Strict scrutiny signals the doctrinal presumption that a
judge should strike official actions unless there is an overriding
legal interest, such as national security, judicial neutrality, or
electoral integrity.241 That is a high standard for schools to meet,
but simply evaluating whether officials have a compelling reason
to suppress student speech is too ambiguous. Consistency and
predictability is well served by a greater certainty about the
proper mode to analyze facts in the context of constitutional
precedents.
Historically, courts have been reluctant to rely on strict
scrutiny assessment in the special circumstances of child and adolescent education. 242 Their hesitancy is born of the reality of education. Besides the acquisition of knowledge, discipline is essential to the dissemination of information, culture, and
discipline to young learners. Schools cannot be treated as traditional public forums because maintaining a successful learning
environment ordinarily requires educators to quell student disruptions and to forbid mischievous behaviors, reward positive

them . . . .”); see also Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365,
377 n.39 (2014).
240. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
241. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665–66 (2015) (implying
the Humanitarian Law Project holding was based on strict scrutiny); id. at 1666
(plurality relying on strict scrutiny to uphold a content-based campaign solicitation restriction on judicial candidates); id. at 1676 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accepting plurality’s claim that strict scrutiny applies, but disagreeing that the
state met its burden); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28
(2010) (applying “more rigorous” than intermediate scrutiny); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion upholding a distance restriction for campaigning near a campaign booth on the date of election).
242. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment, are available to teachers and students.”).
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behaviors, and rely on pedagogical techniques for students to
succeed. 243
The need to maintain order in the classroom does not diminish students’ interests in challenging and articulating positions
about controversial matters, such as the illegality of narcotics.
Without seriously reflecting on the political nature of drug-related protests, the Court in Morse discounted a student’s ability
to express opposition to laws criminalizing the use of marijuana;244 although, that is clear viewpoint discrimination.
Classrooms should be treated similarly to nonpublic forums,
where administrators can use reasonable and neutral criteria,
such as their places of residency or test scores for enrollment and
curriculum purposes, but cannot resort to viewpoint discrimination.245 This is not to say that schools have no role in the development of childhood character, civility, and temperance. To the
contrary, as Amy Gutmann points out, “The aim of cultivating
good character authorizes teachers to respect only a limited
range of values professed . . . by children. Indiscriminate respect
for children’s values cannot be defended either as an ultimate
end or as a tenable means to cultivating good character.” 246 Nevertheless, when students express controversial views, whether
about something at the level of national politics or about their
own school, differences with the administration should not be
stymied, suppressed, or punished but engaged, answered, and
appraised.
Schools are not, however, quintessential nonpublic forums
“[w]here the government is” simply “acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations.” 247 Unlike airports or government
243. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague
Letter on the Nondiscriminatory Administration of School Discipline (Jan. 8,
2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401-title-vi
.html (“Many schools have adopted comprehensive, appropriate, and effective
programs demonstrated to: (1) reduce disruption and misconduct; (2) support
and reinforce positive behavior and character development; and (3) help students succeed.”).
244. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 440 (2007).
245. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 64
(1983) (“[W]hatever the right of public authorities to impose content-based restrictions on access to government property that is a nonpublic forum, once access is granted to one speaker to discuss a certain subject access may not be
denied to another speaker based on his viewpoint.”).
246. GUTMANN, supra note 1, at 56.
247. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992). Alan Brownstein argues that public schools should be treated as nonpublic forums. As he points out, “hallways, school yards, and lunch rooms of
public schools have not been deliberately opened up by school authorities for
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office buildings, schools are organized to enhance students’ abilities to deliberate, analyze, ascertain, reflect, and share ideas.
The Tinker test recognizes the unique pedagogical settings of K–
12 education. Educators can rely on content-neutral, time, place,
and manner considerations; however, within the parameters of
a specific class or an educational program, any further rules
must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. 248 Strict scrutiny
should apply to the suppression of students’ viewpoints. While
teachers need the latitude to supervise lesson plans and prevent
students from disrupting learning in the classroom and on the
playground, students should be allowed freely to voice ideas,
facts, and views absent a compelling state interest. It is reasonable for teachers or administrators to require students to stay on
topic in class, rather than interrupting about irrelevant subjects
unfettered discussion and debate any more than the foyers and hallways of most
government buildings have been opened up for unfettered discussion and debate.” Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored
Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 731 (2009).
It may also be argued that schools are limited public forums. Justice
Blackmun takes the latter position in a dissenting argument. Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 829 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that Tinker established a limited public forum test for
public school regulation). It is no wonder that in the same passage, Blackmun
expresses a concern that nonpublic forum analysis to schools would collapse the
distinction between limited public forum and nonpublic forum. Id. The Court
indeed uses the same test for both types of forums. See also Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (asserting that in limited courts
test whether a restriction on communication is reasonable and non-viewpoint
specific); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
392–93 (1993) (“With respect to public property that is not a designated public
forum open for indiscriminate public use for communicative purposes, we have
said that ‘[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject
matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.’” (quoting
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). In
fact, in a recent dissent from a denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas appeared to
disavow the doctrinal distinctions between the two. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative
v. King Cty., 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1022 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If the government creates a limited public forum (also called a nonpublic forum)—
namely, ‘a forum that is limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to
the discussion of certain subjects’—then speech restrictions need only be ‘reasonable and viewpoint neutral.’” (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,
555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009)). It strikes me, however, that nonpublic forum characterizes a broader set of locations, while limited public forum refers to specific
locations, like library study rooms or school auditoria, reserved for specific individuals or organizations.
248. Hastings Christian Fellowship v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010)
(stating that “restrictions on access to a limited public forum . . . must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral”).
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that would disrupt fellow students. However, the First Amendment prohibits administrators from censoring students communicating unorthodox views to teachers, principals, and classmates.
The Supreme Court has failed to give adequate weight to
student speech, countenancing overt viewpoint restrictions on
speech about drugs, 249 abortion, and pregnancy.250 This approach treats student speech as of some low-order category, external to the First Amendment, much as incitement or child pornography. This approach is entirely incongruous with the
Court’s prohibition of viewpoint discrimination absent compelling state interest and narrow tailoring. Justices have increasingly construed the significance of schools’ special expressive
characteristics as a rationale to attribute a low value to student
communications.251 The deference the Court has shown schools
in the last three decades has short-shifted the intellectual and
political growth and sophistication of children as they progress
through grade school and high school. 252 Moreover, lower courts
should differentiate between speech causing non-educational
disruptions, such as threats made on school playgrounds, 253 and
others causing political disturbances, such as speech about controversial subjects such as grading standards and purported racism.254
The Court’s trend to treat student speech as having a low
value runs counter to my proposed heightened level of scrutiny
for viewpoint restrictions on student speech. The Court’s repeated deference to school officials in cases like Morse, recognized the need for sufficient flexibility to allow officials to deter

249. Morse, 551 U.S. at 393.
250. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
251. See Frank D. LoMonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students Are “Persons” Under Our Constitution—Except When They Aren’t, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1323, 1348
(2009) (criticizing “the extraordinary deference that is afforded to administrators in managing school affairs and the relatively low value afforded to the
speech of young people”).
252. Amy Gutmann, What Is the Value of Free Speech for Students?, 29 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 519, 523 (1997) (“[L]aws governing free speech in schools should increasingly respect the free speech rights of students varied by age.”).
253. S.G. ex rel. A.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ., 333 F.3d 417, 423 (3rd Cir.
2003) (declining to differentiate under what circumstances a school may violate
an elementary school student’s freedom of speech rights).
254. Baxter v. Vigo Cty. Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 736–38 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding a principal’s qualified immunity against a law suit challenging the punishment of a student for wearing a t-shirt to protest grades and racism).
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and punish disciplinary breakdowns. Yet, the judiciary sometimes bows to speculative claims, unsupported by evidence, such
as the notions that the “BONG HITS 4 JESUS” poster would entice children to experiment with drugs 255 or that the demand to
hold a music festival earlier in the school year might cause disruption. 256
The Supreme Court’s lack of exacting scrutiny empowers
school suppression of controversial ideas. 257 As explained in Part
II, several lower court decisions have followed recent Supreme
Court student speech precedents by adopting rational basis review of school disciplinary measures. This approach is consistent
with the deferential review of low value categories in Stevens,
Alvarez, and Entertainment Merchants.
In Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse, the Court granted schools
authority to regulate content of student speech without a rigorous framework against discretionary viewpoint discrimination.
As Mary-Rose Papandrea has explained:
[T]o the extent the Court’s school speech jurisprudence is based on the
“special circumstances” of the school environment—and not on the age
of their students—it must at bottom rest on the sense that schools have
a mission, and that offering students full speech rights would interfere
with that mission. 258

Speculation about the possibility of disruption or even illegality is insufficient reason to abridge speech in a setting meant
to expose children to democratic deliberation, tolerance, information, free thought, wisdom, and alternative perspectives. Rather than emphasizing the obvious value of speech to social development, the judicial trend has become to emphasize discipline
to the detriment of expression. Instead of taking a hands-off approach, courts should rigorously safeguard student speech, absent specific evidence of the substantial disruption that Tinker
set as an exception to the general latitude to student communications. Expressing controversial viewpoints has never been considered disruptive in other areas of free speech jurisprudence,
and this principle should apply to young citizens.
Rather than a categorical acceptance of school administrators’ decisions, courts should use contexualized analysis in adju255. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 4398–99 (2007).
256. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2014).
257. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–91 (1992) (discussing historically
unprotected categories of speech and finding that the First Amendment generally prohibits viewpoint discrimination).
258. Papandrea, supra note 1.
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dicating student speech cases that involve core First Amendment values. While the classroom requires discipline commensurate with age and learning environments, students should be
free to vent ideas about politics, art, and even the sciences within
and without the school walls. Inevitably, young learners will express many false ideas, but school is a great marketplace of ideas
for setting them aright. First Amendment protection of viewpoints is not a shield against bad grades for poorly reasoned, articulated, or unsupported school work. In an educational environment, some limitations are necessary to maintain classroom
discipline, advance knowledge, and evaluate quality; however, in
school settings outside the classroom, such as lunchrooms and
playgrounds, discussions on controversial subjects should typically be free of censure because of the civic values involved. On
the other hand, where the suppression of content is only coincidental to school time, place, or manner regulations (such as rules
on noise in lunch rooms or length of class periods) or the regulation of conduct (such as on disruptive classroom antics), courts
should be more deferential to administrators. I propose a balanced method to respect the value of student engagement in creative and political thought while also being cognizant that without supervision many K–12 classrooms will likely deteriorate
into a free-for-all.
Nevertheless, rather than treating student speech as a lowvalue category, unworthy of close judicial scrutiny, the Court
should use sophisticated judicial review. Students function in
various environments while they are at school and school-related
activities. In certain circumstances their abilities to deliberate
on public matters is on a par with any other citizen’s. This is
particularly true where student communications are political,
artistic, or self-assertive. On the other hand, content neutral educational restrictions are necessary to advance pedagogical
goals. And as a government actor in a representative democracy,
it is legitimate, indeed necessary, for the school to promulgate
pluralism and tolerance in school and society at large.
C. CONFLICTING CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS: THE CASE OF
CONFEDERATE SYMBOLS
The balancing test will sometimes require judicial weighing
of conflicting constitutional interests. Students’ right to free
speech is not absolute, and sometimes their communications
raise competing legal concerns. There is no First Amendment
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justification for harassment. 259 This is not only based on norms
of civility but constitutional and statutory provisions. This section of the Article articulates how the Thirteenth Amendment’s
grant of authority to punish student displays of the badges of
slavery and the statutory mandate to prevent educational harassments balances against speakers’ First Amendment interests.
1. The Thirteenth Amendment and the Badges of Slavery
and Involuntary Servitude
Schools are authorized to enforce rules predicated on constitutional norms, even in some narrow contexts where competing
interests limit student speech. Illustrative of this point are cases
that deal with students who challenge school punishments for
wearing Confederate logos. Such symbolism is semantically and
historically connected with the badges of slavery and involuntary servitude. 260
The popular symbol for the Confederate flag is based on the
St. Andrew’s Cross. 261 It was the battle flag of the Confederacy
and communicated support for a secessionist rebellion, fought to
defend the institution of slavery. In the mid-twentieth century,
segregationists proudly waived the Confederate flag as a statement opposing the holding in Brown v. Board of Education that
separate-but-equal public school education violates the Equal
Protection Clause. 262 Schools have a special obligation to prevent
259. Cf. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at, 410 (1992) (White, J., concurring) (stating that
the First Amendment does not protect the perpetrators of workplace harassment); West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1363, 1364
(10th Cir. 2000) (finding due process to have been satisfied in the punishment
of a middle school student who drew Confederate flag against school anti-harassment policy).
260. See Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539 (2002).
261. MARC HOWARD ROSS, CULTURAL CONTESTATION IN ETHNIC CONFLICT
286 (2007); Gerald R. Webster & Jonathan I. Leib, Fighting for the Lost Cause:
The Confederate Battle Flag and Neo-Confederacy, in NEO-CONFEDERACY: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 173 (Euan Hague et al. eds., 2008).
262. See LAWRENCE BLUM, “I’M NOT A RACIST, BUT . . .”: THE MORAL QUANDARY OF RACE (2002);WILLIAM PENCAK, CONTESTED COMMONWEALTHS: ESSAYS
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 334 (2011) (recounting that in the 1950s and 1970s “the
state flags of Georgia (1956) and South Carolina (1963) incorporated the Confederate Battle Flag . . . an action taken by their legislature explicitly to support
segregation as well as to honor the Confederacy”); John Walker Davis, An Air
of Defiance: Georgia’s State Flag Change of 1956, 82 GA. HIST. Q. 305, 317 (1998)
(relating the uses of Confederate flag in Georgia as a rallying symbol against
desegregation); Chris Springer, The Troubled Resurgence of the Confederate
Flag, HISTORY TODAY (1993) (discussing symbolic features of the Confederate
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on-campus advocacy in support of violent, hateful ideology, such
as the one that supports a symbol historically referent of slavery
and involuntary servitude. 263
Several circuits have reviewed public school punishments or
suspensions of students for wearing clothes containing Confederate symbolism.264 In Defoe v. Spiva, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a Tennessee school
board’s ban against wearing Confederate symbols at school. 265
The majority reviewed the board’s determination that displaying
a symbol at a school with decades of racial tension was likely to
disrupt and materially interfere with school activities. 266 The
court stated that the school could regulate display of that “controversial racial and political symbol.” 267 Speech was not the
only constitutional interest at stake in the case. The circuit court
failed to evaluate the First Amendment issues in the context of
alternative Thirteenth Amendment values. It should have clarified how schools, their boards, and teachers can invoke objective
criteria for identifying why Confederate symbols are particularly
disruptive in light of the nation’s history, not only in terms of
existing exigencies. The school’s duty to provide equal educational opportunities and to prevent school harassment under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 268 legitimized the administration’s decision to prohibit students from wearing the symbol
of slavery to school.

flag) http://www.historytoday.com/chris-springer/troubled-resurgence
-confederateflag.
263. Tsesis, supra note 260, at 543 (discussing the cultural significance of
Confederate symbols placed on state property). See also Julie Novkov, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Meaning of Familial Bonds, 71 MD. L. REV. 203, 215
(2011) (arguing that a “potential contemporary interpretation of badges of slavery . . . is the use of Confederate signs and symbols as a means of expressing a
hostile agenda toward African-Americans”).
264. See, e.g., A.M. ex rel. McAllum v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 223 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“[T]he racially inflammatory meaning associated with the Confederate flag and
the evidence of racial tension at BHS establish that defendants reasonably forecast that the proscribed speech might cause substantial disruption of school activities.”); B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 741 (8th Cir. 2009)
(holding that evidence of prior “racially-motivated violence, racial tension, and
other altercations directly related to adverse race relations in the community
and the school” justified school district’s ban on Confederate symbols in school).
265. Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010).
266. Id. at 334.
267. Id. at 336 (quoting Castorina v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536,
542 (6th Cir. 2001)).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
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Preventing the use of Confederate symbolism at school is
one of those rare cases in which government has a compelling
interest to suppress cultural or political statements. 269 Confederate symbols are insignia with a distinct history that signal violence and oppression. The Confederate battle flag was a call to
arms, to protect the institution of slavery and racial subordination.270 Human bondage was not the only evil of slavery. In the
Old South, blacks were also denied an education and even prohibited from learning how to read. 271 The Confederate flag,
therefore, is also a statement against equal, desegregated education.
Admittedly, not all people understand it that way and controversy exists about the meaning of the Confederate flag. While
some would agree that it is a symbol of the badges and incidents
of slavery, such as educational inequality, others believe it symbolizes only benign Southern culture. 272 Nevertheless, the fact
that there is a relevant constitutional provision empowering government to prohibit the uses of badges and incidents of slavery,
makes the situation unique. Matters are of course different if the
flag is displayed in a historical text or school museum, where it
is part of a narrative of past events. And courts should examine
the context of the challenged display.
269. The seminal case of a compelling government interest in suppressing
political speech upheld a ban on electioneering within one hundred feet of a
polling station on the day of elections. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211
(1992).
270. See James Forman, Jr., Note, Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate Flag from Southern State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505, 513 (1991) (describing how the Confederate Flag was meant to rally soldiers to battle).
271. Theodore Weld, in 1839, exclaimed that enslaved parents had “as little
control over [their children] as have domestic animals over the disposal of their
young.” THEODORE D. WELD, AMERICAN SLAVERY AS IT IS 56 (Arno Press 1968)
(1839). Slave parents were particularly restrained from educating their children. Indeed, many states forbade slaves from receiving any form of education,
even though some blacks learned clandestinely with the help of sympathetic or
self-interested whites. Concerning African American resourcefulness in using
linguistic skills to elevate themselves from slavery and cultural prejudices, see
Kimberly Rae Connor, To Disembark: The Slave Narrative Tradition, 30 AFR.
AM. REV. 35, 36 (1996); Joyce E. Williams & Ron Ladd, On the Relevance of
Education for Black Liberation, 47 J. NEGRO EDUC. 266 (1978). In the South,
general education for blacks began only in 1861 in Fortress Monroe, Virginia.
Ellis O. Knox, A Historical Sketch of Secondary Education for Negroes, 9 J. NEGRO EDUC. 440, 445 (1940).
272. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
2262 (2015) (asserting that some wave the Confederate battle flag “to evoke the
memory of their ancestors and other soldiers who fought for the South in the
Civil War,” while “[t]o others, it symbolizes slavery, segregation, and hatred”).
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School officials’ actions are warranted in those cases where
students laud the Confederacy because, at least part of the student body, will not only take offense but is also likely to become
violently angered, alienated, or harassed by school authorities’
toleration of the symbol’s display.273 In their effort to advance
civic responsibility in students and inculcating the antidiscrimination value of the Reconstruction Amendments, education administrators can legitimately find that wearing a Confederate tshirt or flying a Confederate flag while on school grounds or during school activities undermines the lessons of civil equality inculcated into our federal government by the constitutional prohibition of slavery and its badges and incidents. 274
An elaborate Fourth Circuit discussion, in Hardwick v. Heyward, examined the enforcement of a South Carolina school district’s dress code, which forbade students from wearing “anything . . . deemed to be offensive,” such as drug advocacy or
alcohol advertisements. 275 Even though that policy did not specifically mention Confederate symbols, officials repeatedly
warned a student to abide by a ban of Confederate symbols. 276
After receiving explicit warnings from school officials, a student
was suspended, and her parents subsequently brought a cause
of action on First Amendment and Equal Protection grounds. 277
School officials answered that the policy and disciplinary
measures were needed because of the disruptive nature of the
symbol and past racial conflicts at the plaintiff’s school. As with
Defoe, the Hardwick circuit court relied on Tinker, finding that
“school officials could reasonably forecast that all of these Con-

273. See Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding the decision of school to suspend student wearing clothing with Confederate symbol in part based on testimony of school official that “displays of the
Confederate flag would be a distraction to any student offended by it and could
result in some sort of dangerous disagreement resulting in conflict or violence”);
Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 560 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that a school’s ban of
Confederate symbols in school did not violate the First Amendment because officials foresaw disruptions and the school’s principal saw “the confederate flag
as both offensive and disruptive”).
274. See Denno v. Sch. Bd., 218 F.3d 1267, 1273 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding
that educators could prohibit the use of Confederate symbols at schools to advance lessons of civility, in keeping with the Supreme Court’s holding in Fraser).
275. Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 430 (4th Cir.
2013).
276. Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 674 F. Supp. 2d 725, 729 (D.S.C.
2009).
277. Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick, 711 F.3d at 430–32.
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federate flag shirts” she had worn “would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.” 278 Officials were not required to wait until there was an actual disruption but could “reasonably forecast” its likelihood and act
accordingly. The court did not treat the school regulation as a
categorical limitation on low-value statements; instead, the
court used a sophisticated analysis of the contextual type I have
proposed in this Article to identify a likely disruption. In addition to its review of conflicting speech and educational interests,
the history of the Confederate symbol, and the effect of the policy
on the general welfare of the school, the Hardwick court also
found the dress code to be neither overbroad nor vague. But the
Court overlooked the relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment in
ascertaining the validity of restricting student’s speech to advance the compelling constitutional value of interracial tranquility in school. Contextual balancing of constitutional interests can
help schools maintain educational environments where so powerful a badge of slavery is outside the pale of decency.
Contrary to my perspective, Professor Catherine Ross takes
the view that Confederate flag displays should be treated as ordinary political speech under the Tinker standard. 279 From her
perspective, “What the Confederate flag meant to those who
waved it in the late 1860s might not be what it means to individuals who display it have a century later.” 280 To the contrary, I
believe the Confederate symbol is permanently connected to the
slave supporting culture from which it became the standard for
battle against the Union. Its expression of states’ rights is bound
to the political outlook that encouraged state governments to
permanently safeguard the institution of slavery. The same is
true of other symbols of destructive regimes: the swastika has a
permanent connection with Nazis, the hammer and sickle refers
to the Bolshevik regime, and the ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria) flag is connected to the demand of a radical Islamic caliphate. These are not merely emblems of historical moments. Indeed, when they are depicted in a history book, in a transparency
shown in journalism class, or a newspaper article handed out
during a roundtable of a contemporary issues course, all of these
flags are protected speech. Certainly having a Confederate symbol display in a textbook, a poster presentation, or some other
278. Id. at 438.
279. CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP: HOW SCHOOLS AND
COURTS SUBVERT STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 184 (2015).
280. Id. at 183.
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educational setting are protected aspects of the First Amendment marketplace of ideas. They are relevant to the exchange of
ideas in the academic setting. It is when they are worn on tshirts, drawn, hung on lockers, printed on school newspaper
logos, and used in advocacy contexts that they bring to mind the
heinous ideologies of those regimes. Where Confederate flags are
depicted in schools outside the educational process, administrators can ban them pursuant to the principles of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
Ross’s point, nevertheless, brings to mind an important insight: context matters. Not all Confederate displays are likely to
be harassing enough to disrupt education. Unless Confederate
symbols are persistently or pervasively on display at a school, it
is unlikely that a court would find the harassment to be present.281 Requiring proof of educational disruption before enforcing a policy prohibiting the display of Confederate symbols creates an objective standard, one that can be tested against facts
on the ground, rather than on the basis of a subjective heckler’s
veto, predicated on hypersensitive students. 282
2

Harassment Statutes and Hate Messages

Administrators are presented with a separate set of legal
concerns when confronting students who appear at school-sponsored activities wearing clothes displaying hate messages unconnected to Confederate symbols. A student may, for instance,
dress in a shirt with a swastika; a degrading statement characterizing homosexuals as pedophiles; or a genocidal message,
such as, “The Only Good Indian Is a Dead Indian.” In those circumstances, federal law should define the extent to which principals or teachers can maintain discipline without infringing on
the First Amendment rights of students.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 obligates recipients
of federal educational subsidies to maintain environments where

281. Cf. Atkins v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., No. C04-5779RBL, 2005 WL
1356261, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 7, 2005) (stating that under federal law prohibiting discrimination in education settings, actionable conduct must be persistent, pervasive, or severe).
282. See Whitfield v. Notre Dame Middle Sch., 412 F. App’x 517, 521 (3rd
Cir. 2011).
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students are not subject to racism, color preferences, or xenophobia.283 Title VI enjoins recipients from operating institutions
where “harassing conduct (e.g., physical, verbal, graphic, or written) . . . is sufficiently severe, pervasive or persistent so as to interfere with or limit the ability of an individual to participate in
or benefit from the services, activities or privileges provided by
a recipient.” 284 A school engaging in discrimination or failing to
reasonably investigate and respond to notifications of hostility
can be found liable.285 The school might directly receive notice of
harassment (as by letter or oral communication with a school
agent) or indirectly (as by media report). 286 In some cases the
“pervasiveness, persistence, or severity of the racial harassment
may be enough to infer that the recipient had notice of the hostile
environment.” 287
Not all expressions of derogatory “views, words, symbols or
thoughts that some person finds offensive” are actionable. 288
However, displaying hate symbolism and messages at school
goes beyond mere offensiveness. Displays of degrading, genocidal, or dehumanizing symbolism constitute harassment that is
unprotected by the First Amendment. Intimidating, threatening, and coercive educational harassment interferes with students’ abilities to study. It can interfere with students’ progress
through hallways, limit their participation in curricular and after-school activities, intimidate them from joining clubs, or lead
to truancy.
Harassing interference with education is analogous to workplace harassment, where hostility can impede job performance.289 In the workplace setting, the free speech claim is such
a nonstarter that even when the parties briefed the question, the
Supreme Court refused to reach the issue. 290 Harassment in the
283. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). The statute extends to members of religious
groups. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979) (“[V]ictims of discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or national origin have had private Title
VI remedies available at least since 1965.”).
284. Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational Institutions, Investigative Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 11,448, 11,449 (Mar. 10, 1994).
285. Id. at 11,450.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 243.
289. See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 92
(2009) (stating that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act protects against discrimination of employment opportunities based on race and gender).
290. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and
the First Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13 (asserting
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workplaces and schools targets captive audiences; under those
circumstances, officials are granted greater discretion to create
time, place, and manner restrictions against severe, pervasive,
or persistent discriminatory expressions, such as pro-Nazi homophobic, and anti-Indian emblems. 291 If a school fails to act
against pervasive and severe racist harassment, Title VI grants
the Justice Department or Department of Education the authority to intervene and pursue remedies.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, courts have increasingly deferred to public
school authorities in student speech cases. This trend has diminished the scope, thoroughness, and rigor of judicial review, treating certain forms of student speech as low value categories unworthy of First Amendment protections. This precedential shift
in K–12 has empowered administrators to punish students who
express controversial points of view about matters such as pregnancy, abortion, and illegal drugs. Some courts have even refused to engage in First Amendment review of school punishments for student speech made off campus on social media. That
tends to chill student communications about matters like student government, events, community, and maturation.
School is too important a locus for deliberation, petition, and
assembly to leave decisions negatively impacting students’ free
speech rights at the sole discretion of administrators. Student
speech is essential to the development of individuals and the
flourishing of civic society. Courts should therefore review
whether a school suppressed speech because of the student’s expressed political, artistic, or scientific viewpoint. Speech restrictions on core First Amendment values and uttered outside
the school should warrant strict scrutiny review, but where
statements are communicated during school sponsored activities
that “the Supreme Court’s failure to notice a First Amendment question would
signal its unanimous view that there was no question to be noticed—a judgment
that the prohibited category was so clearly unrelated to the First Amendment’s
purposes that it should not be dignified with an explanation as to why it constituted an ‘exception’”). Compare Brief for Respondent at 31, Harris v. Forklift
Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (No. 92-1168), 1993 WL 302223 (briefing First
Amendment implications), and Reply Brief of Petitioner at 10, Harris v. Forklift
Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (No. 92-1168), 1993 WL 632335 (briefing First
Amendment implications), with Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (omitting discussion of First Amendment concerns).
291. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., No. 96-2181-JWL, 1997 WL 292123,
at *7–8 (D. Kan. 1997); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.
1486, 1534–36 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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judges should rely on a contextually rich time, place, and manner analysis.

